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Financial Market Consequences of Early Adoption of International 
Standards on Auditing: International Evidence 
Abstract: 
Purpose: This paper investigates the effects of the early adoption of International Standards 
on Auditing (ISAs) on Financial Market Indicators (FMIs) from a Diffusion of Innovation 
(DOI) theory perspective.  
Design/methodology/approach: Using panel data from 110 countries in a period that spans 
from 1995 to 2014, this study applies an ordinary least squares (OLS) regression model to 
investigate the financial consequences of adopting ISAs. This analysis was supplemented with 
estimating a fixed-effects and two-stage least squares (2SLS) regression models in order to 
address any concerns regarding the possible existence of endogeneity problems.  
Findings: This study reports three key findings. First, we find that early ISAs adoption has a 
negative effect on several financial market consequences, namely stock market integration, 
market capitalisation, market turnover, market return, market development, stock price 
volatility, and stock trading volume. Second, using an alternative measure to the one that is 
proposed by DOI theory, we found that some financial indicators have been significantly 
improved after ISAs adoption, but only for listed firms that prepared their financial statements 
under International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) and audited by ISAs simultaneously. 
Finally, the financial indicators of European stock markets, however, have insignificantly 
shrank post the mandatory adoption of ISAs in 2006. 
Practical implications: Our empirical evidence raises questions about how ISAs were 
enforced and implemented. For example, countries that adopted ISAs at early stages may have 
been dominated mostly by recently established stock exchanges. This implies a crucial need to 
determine and apply the best type of auditing regime that can increase investors trust and 
enhance the credibility of stock markets information, which might ultimately advance the FMIs 
over time significantly. 
Originality/value: To-date, studies investigating the impact of the adoption of ISAs on FMI 
from a DOI theory perspective are virtually non-existent. Our study, therefore, seeks to 
contribute to the extant literature by examining the influence of ISAs adoption on a wide range 
of financial market indicators. 
Keywords: International Standards on Auditing, Financial Market Indicators, Financial 
Consequences, Diffusion of Innovation Theory, Stock Market.  
Research Classification: Research paper 
Introduction 
     Foreign investors tend to invest in those stock markets characterised by a higher level of 
transparent auditing standards and high-quality accounting information (Boolaky & Omoteso, 
2016; Boolaky & Soobaroyen, 2017). International standards on auditing (ISAs), therefore, 
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have been adopted by many countries to attract more inward foreign direct investments (FDI) 
to their financial markets (Al-Awaqleh, 2010; Rudhani et al., 2017). Stock markets, on the 
other hand, expect to obtain some financial benefits from adopting ISAs, such as lower cost of 
capital (Fraser. 2010; Wong, 2004). In this regard, Francis et al. (2003) argue that the 
development of financial markets is positively linked to a higher quality of auditing standards 
mainly in those countries characterised by vigorous legal enforcement for investor protection. 
   Although previous studies have examined the influence of stock market development on the 
strength of auditing and reporting standards (e.g., Boolaky, 2011; Boolaky & Cooper, 2015; 
Boolaky & O’Leary, 2011; Boolaky & O’Leary, 2012; Boolaky et al., 2013), very limited 
attention has been paid to examining the relationship between the adoption of ISAs and stock 
market indicators, such as market capitalisation (e.g., Boolaky & Soobaroyen, 2017; Boolaky 
& Omoteso, 2016). For example, to date, studies investigating the impact of the adoption of 
ISAs on financial market indicators (FMIs) are virtually non-existent. Our research, therefore, 
seeks to contribute to the extant literature by examining the influence of ISAs adoption on a 
range of financial market consequences at the macro-country level.  
     At the macro-country level, prior studies have examined the influence of adopting 
accounting innovation practices, such as International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) 
on a few financial consequences (i.e., stock market capitalisation), either from the perspective 
of institutional theory (e.g., Boolaky & Soobaroyen, 2017) or Hofstede-Gray framework 
perspective (e.g., Boolaky & Omoteso, 2016). However, we distinctively employ the Diffusion 
of Innovation (DOI) theory to explain the financial consequences of adopting ISAs. According 
to DOI theory, a group of adopters might tend to adopt innovations rapidly at the initial stages, 
or it may prefer to delay its adoption to late stages based on their characteristics. As a result, 
the DOI theory suggests that adopters of innovations can be classified into five main groups 
based on their first-time adoption. These groups are experimenters, early adopters, early 
majority, late majority, and non-adopters (Rogers, 1976; Rogers, 2002; Robertson, 1967). 
     Consequently, and employing a DOI theoretical framework, we examine the extent to which 
early ISAs adoption impact on a wide range of FMIs. A priori, the higher level of transparency, 
reliability and credibility regarding auditing standards and high-quality accounting information 
that is often associated with the adoption of ISAs is expected to result in observable 
improvement in FMIs. Thus, we specifically examine how ISAs adoption affect seven FMIs, 
including financial/stock market: (i) capitalisation; (ii) development; (iii) integration; (iv) 
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liquidity (v) returns; (vi) trading volume; and (vii) volatility. Our findings suggest that early 
adoption of ISAs has a negative effect on seven financial market consequences, namely 
financial integration, market capitalisation as a percentage of GDP, market capitalisation in 
USD, stock market traded to GDP, stock market turnover, stock market return, stock price 
volatility and financial market development. By contrast, we find that mandatory ISAs 
adoption by most EU countries in 2006 has no significant effect on financial market 
consequences. Our findings, therefore, extend the existing literature by offering new evidence 
on the effect of early ISAs adoption on FMIs. 
    The remainder of this study is organised as follows. Section 2 presents the background to 
the adoption of ISAs. Section 3 discusses the theoretical framework applied in this study. 
Section 4 reviews the empirical literature and develops hypotheses. Section 5 explains the 
research methodology. Section 6 presents the descriptive statistics. Section 7 reports the 
empirical results and discussion. Section 8 discusses the robustness analyses, whilst Section 9 
outlines the conclusions of the study. 
International Auditing Standards and Financial Market Indicators 
     Since the 1960s, the need for issuing one single set of international auditing standards has 
significantly increased in order to meet the requirements of multinational corporations (Needles 
et al., 2002). After the 2008 global financial crisis, many countries have adopted ISAs, 
intending their adoption to improve the quality of their auditing standards (Humphrey et al., 
2009; Mennicken, 2008). In 1991, the International Auditing and Assurance Standards Board 
(IAASB) released 29 International Auditing Guidelines, which are now known as ISAs 
(Roussey, 1996; Humphrey & Loft, 2008). Furthermore, in 2006, the European Commission 
released the audit directive of 2006/43/EC to encourage European countries to adopt ISAs 
(Merkt, 2009). 
       Accordingly, several international bodies, such as the European Federation of Financial 
Analysts Societies (EFFAS), World Trade Organization (WTO), International Organization of 
Securities Commissions (IOSCO), World Federation of Exchanges (WFE), Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC), and Financial Stability Board (FSB) have encouraged 
standards-setters to adopt ISAs in order to improve the quality of their auditing standards 
(Kelly, 1998; Needles et al., 2002; Fraser, 2010). 
     Even though the adoption of ISAs can trigger financial and non-financial benefits (Wang et 
al., 2015), yet, some associated challenges should be considered by audit firms and stock 
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markets adopting, implementing and enforcing ISAs usage among their companies and 
organizations (Kohler et al., 2010). Among other things, these challenges might include a lack 
of human resources, a scarcity of financial resources, shortage of technical skills, inconsistency 
between ISAs requirements and the legal system of a country, and the lack of accuracy in 
translating ISAs into native languages (Hegarty et al., 2004). Therefore, adopters need to weigh 
the opportunities and challenges of applying ISAs before adopting and implementing them 
within a given country (Obaidat, 2007). In this regard, Harahap et al. (2018) conclude that the 
adoption of ISAs has been challenging for some stock markets, although it has led to increasing 
markets profitability and attracting more inward FDIs.  
     Arguably, ISAs adoption can be more challenging for small and new stock exchanges, 
where they usually lack some vital resources, such as finance, technical expertise, 
organisational infrastructure and human resources (Yong & Mahzan, 2013). Additionally, the 
legal origin of a country can be a major factor that could hinder the adoption of ISAs. For 
example, civil law countries tend to experience lower levels of law enforcement in terms of 
protecting the rights of foreign investors in addition to a shortage in the quality of auditing 
standards compared with their common-law counterparts (Ball et al., 2003; Al-Awaqleh, 2010).  
      Against this background and given that we know very little about the effect that the 
adoption of ISAs has on FMIs around the world, we seek to investigate the financial market 
consequences for countries that adopt ISAs. 
Theoretical Framework 
This paper uses the perspective of diffusion of innovation (DOI) theory developed by 
Everett Rogers in 1962 primarily to explain the adoption of ISAs internationally. According to 
DOI theory, there are four main factors that can impact the adoption rate of international 
accounting innovations, namely adopter characteristics, attributes of the innovations, 
communication channels, and adoption time (Rogers, 2003). Therefore, flexible changes with 
relative advantages (e.g., enhanced FMIs) are more likely to be adopted at the initial stages 
than complicated innovations, since they are more difficult to be applied within a short period 
(Rogers, 1995). Gaining desirable financial consequences is, also, one of the relative 
advantages that can encourage countries to adopt international accounting innovations, such as 
ISAs, at the early stages (Rogers, 2003). Moreover, interpersonal networks tend to also serve 
as a communication channel, which can promote peers to adopt the same innovations rapidly 
(Rogers & Kincaid, 1981).  
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     As stated by DOI theory, adopters of international accounting innovations are categorised 
based on their adoption-times into four groups: (i) innovators; (ii) early adopters; (iii) early 
majority; and (iv) late majority and laggards (Rogers, 1962; El-Helaly et al., 2020; 
Elmghaamez, 2019). Adopters of innovations have different purposes for adopting the same 
innovations in order to satisfy their desires (Botha & Atkins, 2005). For example, the number 
of countries that adopted international accounting standards (IASs) has significantly increased 
over time, reflecting the desire of different countries to attract more FDIs into their economies 
(Alon, 2010). Arguably, adopting ISAs can lead to meeting various needs and provide many 
relative advantages, such as enhancing international comparability, increasing the efficiency of 
financial markets and improving global integration to financial markets (Wong, 2004; Mourik 
& Walton, 2014).  
     DOI theory has been applied by prior studies to explain the diffusion of management 
accounting innovations (e.g., Leftesi, 2008; Askarany, 2016; Epstein, 2012; Tucker & Parker, 
2014). Accordingly, we uniquely employed DOI theory to explain the diffusion of ISAs as the 
adoption rate has been gradually increasing over time. 
To date, there is no single theoretical framework that has been appropriately applied to examine 
the expected financial market consequences of ISAs adoption (Kohler, 2009). Consistent with 
previous IFRS research, we also build on positive accounting theory that was developed by 
Watts and Zimmerman (1986) to complement our understanding of the expected financial 
market consequences of ISAs adoption. According to positive accounting theory, financial 
markets are mostly enforced to adopt global accounting, and auditing standards as a response 
to various stakeholders’ pressures, who seek to maximise their utility, which can often lead to 
unintended financial market consequences due to the inherent conflict of interests the exist 
between different stakeholders (Sayumwe & Francoeur, 2017; Senyiit, 2014; Samaha & Khlif, 
2016; Ali et al., 2016; Ball, 2016; Kimeli, 2017; Kabir, 2010). The adoption of international 
accounting and auditing standards has both intended and unintended financial market 
consequences, which might either result in positive or negative effects on capital markets at 
the macro-economic level (Brüggemann et al., 2013). Daske et al. (2013) argue that voluntary 
adopters may only adopt the label of international accounting and auditing standards without 
fully adhering to the requirements of these global standards. Similarly, some scholars believe 
that adopters of ISAs are primarily required in order to have sufficient knowledge, skills and 
training for their audit staff in order to ensure proper application of ISAs (Ali et al., 2016; Ball, 
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2016; Samaha & Khlif, 2016; Kimeli, 2017; Sayumwe & Francoeur, 2017). By doing so, listed 
firms may be able to demonstrate to various stakeholders that they have enhanced the quality 
of their financial statements, and thus achieve potential expected financial market 
consequences from adopting ISAs (Ball, 2001; Elmghaamez & Ntim 2016; Burns & Fogarty, 
2010). 
      Although adoption of a single set of global accounting and auditing standards can improve 
the efficiency of stock markets and increase the international integration among capital 
markets, nevertheless, the absence of needed mechanisms for uniform application and the 
differences across countries in national legal enforcement regimes, investor protection, 
auditing practices, tax regulation and corporate governance practices can lead to a reduction in 
the benefits that stock markets could achieve by adopting these global standards (Palea, 2013). 
Empirical Literature Review and Hypotheses Development 
   Two fundamental mechanisms have been proposed in the current IFRS literature to examine 
the causal relationships between ISAs adoption on FMIs involving environmental impacts and 
economic indicators. However, market mechanisms have not sufficiently been covered in the 
extant ISAs literature (Boolaky & Omoteso, 2016; Boolaky & Soobaroyen, 2017). Hence, it is 
essential to expand these mechanisms to include an additional mechanism, namely, FMIs. This 
is because the practical application of ISAs adoption requires the integration of various 
mechanisms, including environmental, economic and market mechanisms. Hence, in this 
study, a comprehensive range of financial indicators have been included as proxies for market 
mechanisms to test the impact of ISAs adoption on the FMIs. Additionally, financial market 
mechanisms are important because they can consider causality effects of environmental factors 
in addition to the financial consequences of ISAs adoption at the macro or country level. For 
instance, ISAs adoption may affect stock prices, market capitalisation, stock market returns, 
and the other FMIs relevant to the auditing environment of stock exchanges.   
    Furthermore, regulatory enforcement and compliance are one of the primary mechanisms 
that may explain the effect of ISAs adoption on FMIs. Therefore, regulatory authorities of stock 
markets further to accounting and audit standard-setting bodies should establish more rigorous 
audit legislation and robust set of regulations to protect shareholder rights, as well as to increase 
the transparency of financial statements, and thus able to attract more foreign investors 
(Boolaky & Soobaroyen, 2017). 
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    Our study focuses on the theoretical assumptions and classifications suggested by DOI 
theory. In particular, it relies on the current IFRS literature (e.g., El-Helaly et al., 2020; 
Elmghaamez, 2019) as a background to propose its hypotheses, since there is no previous 
empirical research that has been done so far to examine the impact of ISAs adoption on the 
FMIs of the adopting nations. Accordingly, it is possible to compare our results with the 
findings of IFRS studies to examine whether these two accounting innovations have the same 
influence on the various FMIs examined in this study. 
    Most previous studies have examined the influence of adopting IFRS on few FMIs, whereas 
there is no attention being paid to study the financial consequences of adopting of ISAs for 
adopting countries. Therefore and drawing on prior ISAs literature (e.g., Boolaky & Omoteso, 
2016; Boolaky & Soobaroyen, 2017; El-Helaly et al., 2020), we develop our hypotheses to 
examine the relationships between ISAs adoption and a comprehensive set of seven FMIs, 
including (i) financial market integration, (ii) stock market capitalisation, (iii) stock trading 
volume, (iv) stock market turnover, (v) stock market returns, (vi) stock market volatility, and 
(vii) stock market development. By doing so, we contribute to the existing literature by 
responding to the recent call to examine the macro-level consequences of adopting ISAs for 
adopting countries (See Boolaky & Soobaroyen, 2017). 
ISAs adoption and financial market integration 
      Our first hypothesis focuses on examining the effect of ISAs adoption on the level of 
financial market integration. In this case, the majority of prior studies reported that IFRS 
adoption enhances the financial market integration by improving comparability, and thus 
attracting more foreign investors (Li et al., 2013; Jayaraman & Verdi, 2014; De George, 2013; 
Cai & Wong, 2010). However, a few studies show that there is an insignificant relationship 
between the adoption of IFRS and the financial market integration across countries (Naranjo 
et al., 2017; Alnodel, 2016). Therefore, we set the first hypothesis to test the relationship 
between ISAs adoption and financial market integration as follows:     
H1: Countries categorised with early adoption of international auditing standards are more 
likely to have higher levels of financial market integration. 
 
ISAs adoption and stock market capitalisation 
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     Prior literature is primarily suggestive of a positive and significant association between 
IFRS adoption and the financial market capitalisation (Judge et al., 2010; Ben-Othman & 
Kossentini, 2015; Felski, 2015; Lasmin, 2011; Beuselinck et al., 2009; Yurekli, 2016; Klibi & 
Kossentini, 2014; Beneish et al., 2012; Stainbank, 2014). A few others, nevertheless, indicate 
a negative association between IFRS adoption and the financial market capitalisation (Shima 
& Yang, 2012; Hope et al., 2006; Akman, 2011; Clements et al., 2010; Renders & Gaeremynck, 
2007; Brochet et al., 2013). On the other hand, only two studies found an insignificant 
relationship between the adoption of IFRS and market capitalisation (Chebaane & Ben 
Othman, 2014; Riahi & Khoufi, 2015). Therefore, we propose our next hypothesis to test the 
association between ISAs adoption and stock market capitalisation as follows: 
H2: Countries have adopted international standards on auditing early are more likely to have 
higher levels of stock market capitalisation. 
 
ISAs adoption and stock market trading volume 
    With respect to stock trading volume, there have been very few empirical studies that 
examined the relationship between stock trading volume and the adoption of IFRS. Most 
previous studies are indicative of a positive and significant correlation between the volume of 
shares traded and IFRS adoption (Okoye et al., 2014; Brüggemann et al., 2012; Elbakry, 2010; 
Alsaqqa, 2012; Leuz & Verrecchia, 2000; Manyara & Benuto, 2014; Landsman et al., 2012). 
Other scholars concluded that IFRS adoption has led to a reduction in the volume of stocks 
trading on financial markets (Figlioli et al., 2017). Therefore, we suggest the following 
hypothesis to test the relationship between ISAs adoption and stock trading volumes: 
H3: Countries that adopted the international standards on auditing early are more likely to 
have higher levels of stocks trading volumes. 
 
ISAs adoption and stock market turnover 
    With reference to stock market turnover, most previous studies have revealed that IFRS 
adoption has significantly resulted in increasing the ratio of share turnover, since it leads to 
reductions in information asymmetry between firms listed on different stock markets (Leuz & 
Verrecchia, 2000; Loureiro & Taboada, 2012; Bova & Pereira, 2012; Drake et al., 2010; Barth 
et al., 2018). Further empirical studies, however, are supportive of a negative association 
between IFRS adoption and the ratio of stock turnover (Khurana & Michas, 2011; Burnett et 
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al., 2015). Accordingly, this study assumes the following hypothesis to assess the relationship 
between ISAs adoption and stock market turnover as follows:   
H4: Countries characterised with early adoption of international standards on auditing are 
more likely to have a higher stock market turnover. 
 
ISAs adoption and stock market returns 
    The vast majority of previous studies indicated a positive and significant association between 
IFRS adoption and stock market returns (Escaffre & Sefsaf, 2011; Loureiro & Taboada, 2012; 
Yip & Young, 2012; Adereti & Sanni, 2016; Erin et al., 2017; Bartov et al., 2005; Okafor et 
al., 2016; Kang, 2013; Paglietti, 2009). On the contrary, a few studies have suggested a negative 
and significant impact of the adoption of IFRS on stock market returns (Patro & Gupta, 2016; 
Key & Kim, 2017; Klimczak, 2011). Furthermore, a limited number of other studies have 
reported an insignificant relationship between IFRS adoption and stock market returns 
(Alnodel, 2016; Barth et al. 2008). Hence, this study posits the following hypothesis to test the 
association between ISAs adoption and stock market returns as follows: 
H5: Countries categorised with early adoption of international standards on auditing are 
highly likely to have higher stock market returns. 
 
ISAs adoption and stock market volatility 
     Stock market volatility is mostly expected to be remarkably decreased post the adoption of 
IFRS (Chau et al., 2013; Patro & Gupta, 2016; Chalmers et al., 2011; Nulla, 2014). In contrast, 
others believed that stock market volatility is positively attributed to IFRS adoption (Gassen & 
Sellhorn, 2006; Landsman et al., 2012; Daske et al., 2008), whereas only a minimal number of 
studies found mixed results between the adoption of IFRS and stock market volatility 
(Lambertides & Mazouz, 2013; Negi et al., 2014). In return, a few previous studies are 
supportive of an insignificant relationship between stock market volatility and IFRS adoption 
(Leuz & Verrecchia, 2000; Cuijpers & Buijink, 2005; Auer, 1998; Daske, 2006; Floros, 2007). 
Therefore, we propose the following hypothesis to test the relationship between ISAs adoption 
and stock market volatility:  
H6: Countries categorised with early adoption of international standards on auditing are more 
likely to have lower levels of stock market volatility. 
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ISAs adoption and stock market development 
     With a specific focus on stock market development index, most prior studies found a 
positive and significant association between the adoption of IFRS and the level of stock market 
development (Klibi & Kossentini, 2014; Ben-Othman & Kossentini, 2015; Ndagijimana & 
Barayandema, 2017). Similarly, prior auditing studies reported a positive and significant 
association between the strength of auditing and reporting standards and the development of 
the stock market (Boolaky, 2011; Boolaky & Cooper, 2015; Boolaky & O’Leary, 2011; 
Boolaky & O’Leary, 2012; Boolaky et al., 2013). Accordingly, we propose the following 
hypothesis to check the association between ISAs adoption and financial market development:    
H7: Countries categorised with early adoption of international standards on auditing are more 
likely to have better development of the stock market. 
Research Design 
  Sample Selection  
      By 2016, almost 50 countries around the world have not established their stock markets yet 
(De Sousa et al., 2016). Accordingly, due to the limited availability of data related to these 
financial markets, our sample consists of 110 countries from 1995 to 2014, resulting in 2200 
observations. Specifically, countries that have adopted the ISAs within five years after they 
were issued in 1991 are classified as experimenters, and only 6 out of 110 countries adopted 
ISAs by 1995, including Jordan, Malta, Netherland, Peru, Slovenia, and Sri Lanka. Countries 
that adopted ISAs during the Asian crisis of 1997, precisely between 1996-2000 are classified 
as early adopters, and 19 out of 110 nations are included in this group. Countries that have 
adopted ISAs after the Enron scandal of 2001 up to 2004 were classified as early majority 
adopters, which encompass 38 out of 110 nations. Countries that have adopted ISAs after the 
Directive 2006/43/EC on statutory audits were classified as late majority adopters, which 
involved 42 out of 110 countries. We found that only 5 out of 110 countries have not adopted 
ISAs by 2014, and they are classified as laggards of ISAs, including Colombia, Germany 
Oman, Qatar and the USA.  
     Crucially, we have classified the USA as a laggards group based on its adoption status, and 
not based on whether this country has developed auditing or most developed market or not. 
Therefore, including the USA in laggards’ group will not lead to obtaining biased results for 
many reasons. Firstly, we used laggards’ group as a base category, so only the first four groups 
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have appeared in our results tables. Secondly, it is true to say that the inclusion of one unique 
country in a group that consists of several other countries share the same characteristics will 
not lead to obtaining biased results since the effect of these countries will be higher than the 
influence of that unique country. Finally, we have analysed our data without including the USA 
into the non-adoption group of ISAs, but the results remained unchanged. Consequently, we 
included the USA in our selected sample, such that it will not lead to the generation of biased 
results.  
    Table 1 shows the classification of our sampled countries, which are categorised by the DOI 
theory based on their ISAs adoption date. In this sense, Harrell (2001) argues that a study 
should include a minimum of 10 cases per independent variable in order to acquire more 
rigorous empirical results. Therefore, we ended up including 110 cases for two independent 
variables, namely ISAs adoption categories (ISAAC) and ISA adoption status (ISAAS), further 
to three control variables (social factors). Additionally, our sample is representative of 56% of 
the total population (196 countries), which arguably enhances the generalizability of our 
results.  
      There is no consensus among researchers regarding how many subjects and observations 
should a researcher include in order to obtain valid and reliable findings for running multiple 
linear regression. For example, Green (1991) and Schneider et al. (2010) suggest that a 
minimum of 15 observations per independent variable must be included in order to obtain valid 
results. Therefore, our study has included 1,100 observations for an extended period from 
1995-2014 to examine the causal associations between ISAs adoption and financial indicators 
of stock exchanges. To avoid the impact of 2007/2008 financial crisis on our findings, we have 
applied dummy variables to control for the effect of the 2007 financial crisis on the financial 
indicators of stock exchanges. 
      Additionally, the optimal sample size for running multiple linear regression can be achieved 
by using the rule-of-thumb equation suggested by Green (1991) that N ≥ 50 + 8 m, where m is 
the number of predictors included in a study. Accordingly, this study has five predictors, 
including ISAs adopter groups, ISAs adoption status in addition to three control variables: 
geographical location, official language and colonial history, so M=5. By applying the rule-of-
thumb equation, our optimal sample size = 110 ≥ 50 + 8 m, so our sample size was 110 ≥ 90, 
which is higher than the minimum representative sample size proposed by Green. This implies 
that our results could be of a high level of reliability and validity.      
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Insert table 1 about here 
 
Variables Definitions  
     Table 2 shows how our research variables have been operationally defined. In examining 
our hypotheses, we classified the variables into three types. First, our dependent variables are 
the financial consequences of adopting countries. These financial consequences include a wide 
range of FMIs, such as financial market integration (IFNI), the market capitalisation percentage 
of GDP (MCPL), market capitalisation in U.S.D (SMCP), stocks traded (SMTD), stock market 
turnover (SMTO), stock market return (SMRT), stock price volatility (SPVO), and financial 
market development (FMKD).  
     Second, we employ two main independent variables. Firstly, the adoption of ISAs categories 
(ISAAC), which includes five ISAs adopter groups suggested by DOI theory (i.e., 
experimenters, early adopters, early majority, late majority and laggards). The classification of 
these five groups has been constructed based on both the Global Financial Crisis and the 
auditing reforms released by some international bodies, such as the Directive 2006/43/EC that 
issued by the European Commission. Secondly, the adoption of ISAs status (ISAAS), which 
contains nine groups. These ISAs status are ISAs adopted with amendments, ISAs adopted 
without amendments, ISAs adopted with translations, ISAs adopted without translations, ISAs 
adopted with amendments and translations, ISAs adopted by the country law, ISAs adopted in 
gap matters, ISAs adopted for financial statements prepared in accordance to IFRS, and the 
non-adopters’ group of ISAs (Boolaky et al., 2017).  
      Third, we include three variables to control for the financial consequences of ISAs 
adoption. Our control variables include three social factors, namely geographical regions, the 
official language, and colonial history, in addition to year dummies of 2008-09 (D08-09) to 
control for the effect of the most recent Financial Crisis of 2008-2009 on FMIs internationally.  
Insert table 2 here 
Model Specification 
    This study employs a multivariate linear regression analysis based on balanced panel data to 
examine the cause-effect relationship between the FMIs and the adoption of ISAs. This study 
assumes a linear relationship between the dependent variables (FMI) and the independent 
variables. This is because all our dependent variables are naturally continuous. Therefore, the 
multiple linear regression model can be specified as follows: 
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       𝑭𝑪𝑰𝑺𝑨𝒔𝒊𝒕  = 𝜶𝟎 + 𝜷𝟏 𝑰𝑺𝑨𝑨𝑪𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟐 𝑰𝑺𝑨𝑨𝑺𝒊𝒕 + ∑ 𝜷𝒊
𝟒
𝒊=𝟏 𝑪𝑶𝑵𝑻𝑹𝑶𝑳𝑺𝒊𝒕 + 𝜺𝒊𝒕           (1) 
     Where, 𝐹𝐶𝐼𝑆𝐴𝑠𝑖𝑡 is the financial consequences of adopting ISAs for a country (i) in a year 
(t) which involves a wide range of FMI including financial market integration (IFNI), market 
capitalisation (MCPL), market capitalisation (SMCP), stocks traded (SMTD), stock market 
turnover (SMTO), stock market return (SMRT), stock price volatility (SPVO), and financial 
market development (FMKD), 𝛼0 is the constant term, 𝛽𝑗 are the coefficients on the 
independent variables, the first independent variable is ISAs adoption categories (𝐼𝑆𝐴𝐴𝐶𝑖𝑡), 
which includes five adopter categories of ISAs, namely experiments (EXPRA), early adopters 
(ERADA), early majority (ERMJA), late majority (LTMJA), and laggards (LGGRA). The second 
independent variable is ISAs adoption status (𝐼𝑆𝐴𝐴𝑆𝑖𝑡), including non-adopters of ISAs 
(NOAD), ISAs adopted with modifications (WIAM), ISAs adopted without amendments 
(WOAM), ISAs adopted with translation (WITR), ISAs adopted without translation (WOTR), 
ISAs adopted with modifications and translation (WAMT), ISAs required by the country law 
(BLAW), ISAs only apply in matters not regulated by the local standards (GMAT), and financial 
statements issued under the IFRS must be audited by ISAs (IFRSS). ∑ 𝛽𝑖
4
𝑖=1 𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇𝑅𝑂𝐿𝑆𝑖𝑡 
Refers to three control variables, including geographical regions (GERE), official languages 
(OFLN), and colonial history (COHS), in addition to year dummies to control for the global 
Financial Crisis period (D08-09). 𝜀𝑖𝑡 Refers to the error term for the country (i) in a year (t). 
Empirical Results 
  Descriptive Statistics 
     Table 3 presents the descriptive statistics of the dependent variables (i.e., FMIs). It reports 
that only six countries are included in the experimenter's group, 19 in the early adopter's group, 
38 in the initial majority group, and 42 countries in the late majority group, while only five 
nations are classified as laggards.  
     Table 3 also shows that the data relating to the financial integration (IFNI) variable that is 
relevant to the LGGRA and ERMJA groups exhibit the highest and second highest variable 
values among the four adopter categories of ISAs. The data relevant to the LGGRA group 
ranges from -535.68 to 2,288.37, with a higher average of 230.28, and a standard deviation of 
607.95, whereas the data relevant to the ERMJA group ranges from -149.39 to 4,641.46, with 
an average of 75.72, and a standard deviation of 381.17, revealing that there is a considerable 
variation in the data of IFNI relevant to countries included in the LGGRA and ERMJA groups. 
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This result is in line with those of prior studies (e.g., Jayaraman & Verdi, 2014; Cai & Wong, 
2010; De George, 2013).  
     Table 3 also indicates that market capitalisation to GDP (MCPL) variable data that relates 
to the ERMJA group exhibits the highest variable scores among the four adopter categories of 
ISAs. The data of MCPL that is relevant to the ERMJA group ranges from 0.02 to 1,254.47, 
with a higher average of 64.53, and a significant standard deviation of 126.65, indicating a 
considerable variation in the ERMJA group, which is consistent with the results of previous 
studies (e.g., Lasmin, 2011; Judge et al., 2010; Felski, 2015; Klibi & Kossentini, 2014).  
    The data of market capitalisation of listed firms (SMCP) that is relevant to the LGGRA group 
presents the highest dispersion scores of SMCP among the four adopter categories of ISAs. 
The pertinent data to the LGGRA group ranges from 2.38 to 26,330.59, with an average of 
3,379.3 and a standard deviation of 6,454.04, suggesting that there is a substantial variation in 
the data of SMCP relating to the LGGRA group, which is in line with the findings reported by 
previous studies (Beneish et al., 2012; Klibi & Kossentini, 2014; Stainbank, 2014; Ben-Othman 
& Kossentini, 2015).  
Insert table 3 here 
     Similarly, total stock traded (SMTD) data that is relevant to the LGGRA and ERMJA groups 
exhibits the highest and second-highest dispersed data among the four adopter groups of the 
ISAs. This is consistent with the findings of existing studies (Okoye et al., 2014; Brüggemann 
et al., 2012; Elbakry, 2010; Alsaqqa, 2012). Likewise, stock market turnover (SMTO) data that 
is related to the ERADA group exhibits the most significant variable values among the four 
adopter categories of ISAs with a mean of 42.59, a standard deviation of 113.33, indicating a 
wide variation in SMTO variable that is relevant to the countries included in the ERADA group. 
This result is in line with the findings of previous studies (e.g., Leuz & Verrecchia, 2000; 
Loureiro & Taboada, 2012; Bova & Pereira, 2012).  
     By presenting the most substantial variability among the four adopter categories of ISAs, 
stock market return (SMRT) data that is relevant to the LTMJA group is consistent with the 
findings of previous studies (e.g., Alnodel, 2016; Key & Kim, 2017; Klimczak, 2011; Escaffre 
& Sefsaf, 2011; Loureiro & Taboada, 2012).  
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    Additionally, stock price volatility (SPVO) data that relates to the ERADA group exhibits the 
highest variable values among the four adopter categories of ISAs with 13.15 mean value and 
18.23 standard deviation. This result is tied to prior studies (e.g., Leuz & Verrecchia, 2000; 
Cuijpers & Buijink, 2005; Auer, 1998; Daske, 2006; Floros, 2007).  
     While, the financial market development (FMKD) variable data that is relevant to the 
ERMJA and LTMJA groups exhibits the highest and second highest variable values among the 
other four adopter categories of ISAs with an average of 4.39, and a standard deviation of 0.77, 
the FMKD data that is relevant to the LTMJA group ranges from 2.86 to 5.87, with an average 
of 4.35, and a standard deviation of 0.67. Our findings in this regard are in line with the findings 
of prior studies (e.g., Boolaky & O’Leary, 2011; Ndagijimana & Barayandema, 2017).  
     Table 4 provides descriptive statistics for all categorical independent and control variables. 
Specifically, Panel (A) of Table 4 shows that the experimenter's group (EXPRA) includes only 
six countries that adopted ISAs by 1995. The early adopter's group (ERADA) involves 19 
nations that adopted ISAs over the period from 1996-2000. The early majority adopters 
(ERMJA) comprises 38 nations that adopted ISAs over the period 2001-2006. The late majority 
adopters’ group (LTMJA) consists of 42 countries that adopted ISAs late – between 2007 and 
2014. The laggards’ group (LGGRA) includes only five countries that had not yet adopted ISAs 
by 2014.  
     Panel (B) of Table 4 displays the frequency of ISAs adoption status (ISAST) across countries 
up to 2014. Panel B of Table 4 presents a different independent variable namely the ISAs 
adoption status (ISAST), which is different from the ISAs categories suggested by DOI theory 
appear in Panel A of Table 4, which involves five main adopter categories. For example, if a 
country adopted ISAs in 2014, then, such a country will be considered to be a non-adopter over 
the 19 years up to 2013, and it will be classified as adopter only in the final year 2014. 
Therefore, Panel (B) of Table 4 displays that the non-adopters’ group of the ISAs (NOAD) 
includes 1093 observations from 102 countries over the whole period from 1995 up to 2014. 
This is done by gathering the number of non-adopters for each country on the entire period 
until they have adopted ISAs in a specific year. Specifically, there are 28 countries that adopted 
ISAs with some amendments (WIAM), while only ten countries adopted ISAs without any 
amendments (WOAM). Whereas 34 countries embraced ISAs with translation to local 
languages (WITR), only one country (Armenia) adopted ISAs without any translation to its 
local language (WOTR). On the other hand, 16 countries adopted ISAs with amendments and 
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translation alike (WAMT), and 14 countries embraced ISAs to comply with their local laws 
(BLAW). Additionally, only two countries (Austria and Japan) adopted ISAs in order to fill in 
areas where local audit standards do not exist (GMAT), while, only one country (Argentina) 
adopted ISAs just for financial statements that were prepared in accordance with IFRS (IFRS).  
     Regarding the control variables, Panel (C) of Table 4 shows six geographical regions 
(GERE) for 110 destinations around the world as follows: (i) 36 countries in the European 
(EURO) region; (ii) 21 countries from the Latin, North, and South America (LNAM) region; 
(iii) 11 countries from America, the Central and South Asia (CSAS) region; (iv) 15 countries 
from Asia, the East Asia and Pacific (EASP) region; (v) 13 countries from the Middle East and 
North African (MENA) region; and (vi) 14 countries from the sub-Saharan African (AFRC) 
region. 
Insert table 4 here     
     Panel (D) of Table 4 represents the official languages (OFLN), which include seven 
common spoken languages. Panel (D) of Table 4 also shows that the English language (ENGL) 
is a commonly spoken language in 31 countries, three nations use French (FRNL), the Spanish 
language (SPNL) is an official language in 14 countries, the Arabic language (ARBL) is 
commonly spoken in 11 states, the German language (GRML) is an official language in 7 
countries, the Russian language (RUSL) is an official language in 3 nations, and other 
languages are spread among 41 countries. 
    Panel (E) of Table 4 describes the frequency of colonial history (COHS) for 110 destinations 
that consist of 9 common groups. Panel (E) of Table 4 reports that the sample covered 17 never 
colonised countries (NEVC), where all of them adopted ISAs, but at varying periods. The 
sample also includes 37 countries that were colonised by the British Empire (BRTC), five by 
the French Empire (FRNC), 13 by the Spanish Empire (SPNC), two countries colonised by the 
Portuguese Empire (PORC), three by the Dutch Empire (DUTC), two countries by the German 
Empire (GRMC), ten colonised by the Russian Empire (RUSC), and finally, 21 countries were 
colonised by others (OTCO). 
      Table 5 shows the correlation coefficients of Pearson and Spearman matrices. Our results 
suggest that the presence of multicollinearity issues is not a severe statistical problem in our 
study. Crucially, Table 5 shows that the ERADA group is negatively and significantly correlated 
with all the financial market indicators. It also indicates that there are positive and significant 
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correlations between the ERMJA group and IFNI, MCPL and FMKD, suggesting that countries 
that have adopted ISAs at the initial stages are more likely to obtain higher levels of IFNI, 
MCPL and FMKD. Likewise, Table 5 shows positive and significant correlations between 
LTMJA and SMTD, SMTO, SMRT and SPVO, indicating that countries that have adopted ISAs 
during the late stages are more likely to have higher levels of SMTD, SMTO, SMRT, and SPVO. 
Additionally, Table 5 reports positive and significant correlations between the LGGRA group 
and all financial indicators, except for MCPL and SMRT that show insignificant correlations 
with ISAs.  
Insert table 5 here 
Regression Analyses and Discussion 
     This study employs a multivariate linear regression method to test the hypothesised 
relationships between the adoption of ISAs and a range of FMIs. Table 6 shows the results of 
using several statistical tests to check the potential violations of the assumptions of multiple 
linear regression that is used to examine the effects of ISAs adoption on FMIs, including 
heteroscedasticity, linearity, normality, serial-correlation and unit-roots. Accurately, Shapiro-
Wilk and Jarque-Bera tests report that the normality assumption has been violated. Hence, 
according to Templeton et al. (2017), a two-step transformation is the most appropriate method 
to mitigate the normality violation. Similarly, Durbin's alternative and Breusch–Godfrey tests 
show that the serial correlation assumption has been violated. In this case, running a linear 
regression with robust standard errors is the most appropriate method for correcting serial 
correlations (Hoechle, 2007). White and Breusch-Pagan tests indicate that the 
homoscedasticity assumption has been violated. Therefore, the standard cluster-robust mistake 
is the optimal technique to handle the violation of homoscedasticity of error terms and generate 
efficient estimates of residuals, thus providing robust results (Gow et al., 2017). Additionally, 
LLC test and Breitung test indicate that the panel data has a unit root. Consequently, the first-
differences approach is the best method to correct for non-stationary variables (Young, 1993).   
        After addressing all the statistical issues relating to testing the assumptions of linear 
regression, Table 7 shows the results of conducting multiple linear regression models with 
cluster-robust standard errors to examine the ISAs–FMIs nexus.  
     Column 1 of Table 7 reports that countries that adopted ISAs during the initial stages are 
more likely to have lower levels of financial market integration (IFNI). This means that H1 has 
been statistically rejected.  This result is, however, aligned with those of Palea (2013) that state 
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that the absence of the needed mechanisms for uniform application of ISA internationally in 
addition to other differences among countries, such as national legal enforcement regimes, 
investor protection, auditing practices, tax regulation and corporate governance practices, can 
lead to a reduction in the level of financial market integration. 
Insert table 6 here 
    Columns 2 and 3 of Table 7 indicate that countries with lower levels of stock market 
capitalisation are more likely to become the early adopters of ISAs. This means that H2 has not 
been statistically supported. This finding contradicts the results of previous studies (e.g., 
Boolaky & Omoteso, 2016; Boolaky & Soobaroyen, 2017) that found a positive and significant 
association between ISAs adoption and stock market capitalisation level. In line with prior 
studies (e.g., Sayumwe & Francoeur, 2017; Samaha & Khlif, 2016; Ali et al., 2016; Ball, 2016; 
Kimeli, 2017), financial markets are mostly compelled to adopt global accounting and auditing 
standards as a response to various stakeholders’ pressures, who seek to maximise their 
interests; this seemed to be leading to unintended consequences, such as a decreasing level of 
market capitalisation, due to the conflict of interests between stakeholders. 
    As shown in column 4 of Table 7, the results suggest a negative and significant association 
between ISAs adoption and the total value of stock traded (SMTD). This implies that H3 has 
not been statistically supported. However, it is tied to the results of Figlioli et al. (2017) that 
claim that the volume of stocks traded has significantly decreased after the adoption of IFRS 
due to reduction in stock prices. Theoretically, though, if accounting standards were not geared 
to meeting investors' demands in a context that may be characterised by low legal and 
institutional enforcement, the adoption of ISAs may not reflect positive economic 
consequences, such as lower levels of stock traded (Figlioli et al., 2017). 
     As reported in column 5 of Table 7, the stock market turnover (SMTO) has significantly 
decreased after the early adoption of ISAs. This finding does not empirically support H4. It is, 
however, in line with the findings of previous IFRS studies (e.g., Khurana & Michas, 2011; 
Burnett et al., 2015) that reported a negative and significant association between the adoption 
of international accounting standards and stock market turnover. Arguably, Daske et al. (2013) 
state that voluntary adopters may only adopt the label of international accounting and auditing 
standards without fully adhering to the requirements of these global standards, which might 
result in decreasing stock market turnover. 
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    Contrary to the expectation, column 6 of Table 7 reports a negative and significant 
association between ISAs adoption and the stock market return (SMRT). This result indicates 
that H5 is rejected. Even though the negative coefficient on SMRT tends to support the existing 
IFRS literature (e.g., Patro & Gupta, 2016; Key & Kim, 2017; Klimczak, 2011) that suggested 
a negative and significant association between the adoption of international accounting 
innovations and stock market returns, yet, it contradicts the findings of other IFRS studies that 
found a significant and positive association between IFRS adoption and stock market returns 
(e.g., Escaffre & Sefsaf, 2011; Loureiro & Taboada, 2012; Yip & Young, 2012; Adereti & 
Sanni, 2016; Erin et al., 2017; Bartov et al., 2005). In this regard, Barth et al. (2008) explained 
two potential reasons of such a negative association between ISAs adoption and stock market 
returns to include: (i) ISAs may be of lower quality as compared with domestic auditing 
standards; and (ii) other features of financial reporting system can mitigate potential 
development in the quality of auditing information due to the existence of higher quality 
auditing standards (Key & Kim, 2017). 
Insert table 7 about here 
    Column 7 of Table 7 shows a negative and significant association between ISAs adoption 
and stock price volatility (SPVO). This means that H6 has been statistically accepted. This 
result is consistent with previous studies (e.g., Chau et al., 2013; Patro & Gupta, 2016; 
Chalmers et al., 2011; Nulla, 2014) that suggested that the level of stock market volatility has 
been significantly decreased post the adoption of international accounting and auditing 
standards. This appears to imply that both the international accounting and auditing standards 
have the same negative and significant impact on reducing stock price volatility and make stock 
markets more stable, which can attract more foreign investors. Crucially, the scrutiny of foreign 
investors can persuade companies to provide more accurate financial disclosures, where the 
adoption of accounting and auditing standards can provide firms with opportunities to produce 
more informative financial statements, which offer better information to foreign investors and 
reduce stock price volatility (Patro & Gupta, 2016). 
     As shown in column 8 of Table 7, the levels of financial market development (FMKD) have 
been significantly reduced following the early and the mandatory adoption of ISAs. This 
implies that H7 is rejected. This result, though, offers support for the results of Larson and 
Kenny (1995) that reported a negative and significant association between the adoption of 
international accounting innovations and financial market development. Theoretically, our 
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empirical evidence raises questions about how ISAs were enforced and implemented. 
Arguably, countries that had adopted IASs early might have been the ones categorised with the 
most recently established stock markets (Larson and Kenny, 1995). This implies a crucial need 
to determine the best type of accounting and auditing systems that can best help developing 
economies in facilitating their financial market development. 
     The main reason for this inconsistency with previous research is because prior studies have 
focused on examining the influence of strength of auditing and reporting standards on stock 
market development and they found a positive and significant link (Boolaky, 2011; Boolaky & 
Cooper, 2015; Boolaky & O’Leary, 2011; Boolaky & O’Leary, 2012; Boolaky et al., 2013). 
However, our study examines the relationship between ISAs adoption categories suggested by 
DOI theory and stock market development, which can definitely trigger different findings.  
     In column 9 of Table 7, we compute one proxy that summarizes all of the FMIs through the 
mean value. Consistent with our individual variable analysis, it shows that the adoption of ISAs 
has a significantly negative impact on FMIs internationally.  
     In totality, Table 8 shows that the financial consequences are negatively associated with 
early adoption of ISAs internationally. Form a DOI theory perspective, the consequences of 
the adoption of international accounting innovation can be direct or indirect, desirable or 
undesirable, anticipated or unanticipated (Rogers, 1995). In this regard, Tan (2004) defined the 
direct consequences as changes to an organisation that happen immediately as a response to 
innovation adoption, although indirect consequences might take a longer time to develop. In 
line with our results, Schmukler (2004), for example, argues that the globalisation of financial 
markets appeared to lead to large benefits to developing countries with weak financial markets 
integration, but only in the longer term.  
Insert table 8 about here 
      Similarly, Rogers (1995; 2003) argues that the consequences of the adaptation of 
innovation can be either desirable or undesirable. This means that whether a consequence, such 
as market capitalisation level, is desirable or undesirable can be determined by whether the 
effects of innovation adoption (i.e., ISAs adoption) are functional or dysfunctional from a 
particular country point of view (Tan, 1995). In addition, DOI theory states that a financial 
consequence of innovations’ adoption can be anticipated or unanticipated, which is highly 
dependent on whether countries recognise these changes as the intended consequences of the 
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adoption of innovations (Rogers, 1998). Unanticipated financial consequences are likely to be 
unknown to non-adopters until after the effects are widespread (Rogers, 1995; Tan, 1995). This 
implies that countries associated with a higher value of stock traded, stock market returns, and 
financial market development might not be able to anticipate the consequences of ISAs 
adoption until after its impact is well-recognised internationally, which can ultimately lead to 
a late ISAs adoption (Ali Rashed and Mouyiasis, 2013). 
      Although we exclusively use the classification of DOI theory in examining the impact of 
ISAs adoption on FMIs, yet, we also use previous rankings of adopters that are reported by 
Boolaky et al. (2017)1, as an alternative measure. Table 7 reports that ISAs adoption with 
amendments (WIAM) is positively and significantly associated with IFNI and SMCP, and 
negatively with SMTO. ISAs adoption without amendments (WOAM) is positively and 
significantly associated with MCPL, SMCP, SMTD and SMTO. ISAs adoption with translation 
(WITR) is positively and significantly associated with IFNI, MCPL and SMCP, and negatively 
with SMTO. ISAs adoption without translation (WOTR) is negatively and significantly 
associated with SMTD, SMTO and SPVO. ISAs adoption with amendment and translation 
(WAMT) is positively and significantly associated with MCPL, SMCP, SMTD and SMTO, and 
negatively with SMRT and SPVO. ISAs adopted by a country’s law (BLAW) is positively 
correlated with SMTO, while ISAs adopted in “gap matters” (GMAT) is positively and 
significantly attributed to IFNI and SMCP, and negatively with SMRT. ISAs adopted for 
financial reports prepared in accordance with IFRS (IFRSS) is positively and significantly 
associated with IFNI, SMCP, SMRT and SPVO, and negatively with FMKD.  
      Unlike Boolaky et al. (2017), which reported a positive relationship between ISAs adoption 
and FMIs, our results are suggestive of heterogeneous effects of ISA adoption on the financial 
consequences of stock markets in that they might have either encouraged or discouraged the 
FMIs. Even though Boolaky et al. (2017) examined the ISA–FMI nexus across 89 countries 
for four years, we investigate it across 110 countries covering 20 years. This gives more 
credibility and generalisability to our findings, where we argue that unanticipated FMIs could 
be unknown to non-adopters until after the effects of adopting this innovation are widespread 
(Rogers, 1995). This implies that countries associated with higher FMIs appeared not to be able 
 
1Boolaky et al. (2017) measure IAS adoption as follows: “4” means that ISA is mandatory by law, “3” national 
standard setters have adopted ISA as auditing standards, but not mandatory by law, “2” ISAs have been generally 
adopted as the local auditing standards, but subject to modification and finally when a country is coded as “1” it 
means the IFAC does not have adequate information. ‘0’ ISA not adopted”. 
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to anticipate the financial consequences of ISA adoption until after its impact is well-
recognised internationally, which ultimately might lead to the late adoption ISAs by such 
countries (Ali Rashed and Mouyiasis, 2013). 
    Concerning the geographical regions, consistent with prior studies (e.g., Ramanna & Sletten 
2014; De George et al., 2016), we find that countries that adopted ISAs and are located in the 
EURO region seem to have higher levels of MCPL, SMCP, SMTD, SMTO and FMKD, while 
countries that adopted ISAs and are located in the LNAM region tend to have higher levels of 
MCPL. Similarly, adopters in the CSAS region appeared to have higher levels of SMCP, SMTD 
and SMTO, whereas those located in the EASP region tend to have higher levels of MCPL, 
SMCP, SMTD, SMTO, SPVO and FMKD. Likewise, countries in the MENA region lean 
towards having higher levels of MCPL, and lower levels of SMRT. 
      With respect to language, adopters with ENGL as an official language are more likely to 
have higher levels of MCPL, and a lower level of SPVO. Furthermore, FRNL spoken countries 
are more likely to have higher levels of MCPL, SMCP and SMTD. Although adopters with 
SPNL are likely to have higher levels of MCPL, SMTD and SMTO, and lower levels of IFNI, 
others with ARBL tend to have higher levels of MCPL, SMTD and SPVO. Additionally, 
adopters with GRML are likely to have higher levels of IFNI, MCPL and FMKD, and lower 
levels of SPVO, while other adopters with RUSL appeared to have higher levels of FMKD. This 
result indicates that language barriers can also make the adoption of ISAs even harder (De 
George et al., 2016; Hossain et al., 2015). 
    Regarding the colonial history, our results are in line with the findings of previous studies 
(e.g., Ramanna & Sletten, 2009; Degos et al., 2019; Likitwongkajon & Sutthachai, 2019). For 
example, our findings suggest that countries that adopted ISAs and have never been colonised 
NEVC tend to have higher levels of IFNI, MCPL, SMCP, SMTD, SMTO and FMKD. Likewise, 
adopters linked to the SPNC colonisation tend to have higher levels of IFNI, and lower levels 
of MCPL and SMTO, although others colonised by the DUTC Empire have a tendency to have 
higher levels of IFNI and FMKD, and lower levels of SMTD and SMTO. 
Robustness Analyses 
     The country-year level effects might not be detected by solely using multiple linear 
regression. Drawing on prior literature, therefore, a fixed-effects model and a two-stage least 
squares (2SLS) model have been employed as robustness tests (Boolaky & Omoteso, 2016; 
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Boolaky & Soobaroyen, 2017). Crucially, by using country-year level characteristics to control 
for the omitted variables bias, we employ a fixed-effects model. Table 9 presents the results of 
fixed-effects models. Our results suggest that the magnitudes and directions of most financial 
indicators used in our study remained relatively similar to the results of the multiple linear 
models in Table 7. This implies that our results appear to be largely rigorous and reliable. 
Table10 shows the results of estimating a 2SLS model. The results are supportive of the earlier 
inferences that we obtained from estimating both OLS and fixed-effects models, with a small 
degree of sensitivity. This implies that our findings do not appear to suffer from any severe 
endogeneity problems. 
      Insert table 9 & table 10 here 
Conclusion 
      Although prior studies focused on examining the IFRS–FMIs nexus, we have distinctively 
addressed an existing gap in the literature by examining the financial consequences of adopting 
ISAs internationally. We argue that countries with lower levels of FMIs are more likely to 
adopt ISAs as a strategy to attract higher FDIs. In contrast, stock markets in developed 
countries tend to delay their decision to adopt ISAs due to better financial strength and lesser 
motivation to attract inward FDIs compared to their developing counterparts. Additionally, this 
study shows that the extent of international financial integration among countries has 
significantly increased after the introduction and adoption of ISAs, but only for those countries 
where ISAs applies in matters not regulated by the local audit standards. Finally, and most 
importantly, we found that international financial integration and stock market capitalization 
in addition to stock market returns and stock market volatility have significantly improved after 
ISAs adoption, but only for listed firms that issued their financial statements under IFRS and 
audited by ISAs. Furthermore, we argue that DOI theory complements our understanding of 
how countries adopt new accounting innovations, such as ISAs.  
    Our findings of our study have important implications for academics, governments, policy-
makers, practitioners, regulators and standards-setters. For example, it provides an impetus for 
academics to enhance current understanding by conducting further empirical research on the 
relationship between ISAs adoption and the FMIs. Our empirical evidence also raises questions 
about how ISAs were enforced and implemented. For example, countries that had adopted IASs 
at early stages may have been characterised with the most recently established stock exchanges 
and enforced by dominant stakeholder pressures. This implies a crucial need to determine the 
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best type of accounting and auditing systems that can best help emerging economies in 
facilitating the development of their financial markets through positive financial consequences 
of ISAs adoption. 
    Although the results of the present study are robust, several limitations should be 
acknowledged. This study has been limited to 110 countries due to restricted availability of 
data. Additionally, our results might be constrained by the coding scheme suggested by the 
DOI theory, which is based on the adoption-time. Therefore, future research may improve on 
our findings by employing our framework using a larger number of countries and different 
coding schemes to the one that we have used in this study to further test the robustness of their 
findings. Moreover, our results indicate that the adoption of ISAs has a negative effect on FMIs. 
These puzzling results may be attributed to the composition of the study’s sample, which 
includes both countries with high and low enforcement regions. Hence, future studies may 
improve upon our findings by including countries with similar strength of auditing and 
reporting standards.  
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Table 1: The classifications of 110 countries based on their adoption-time into five adopters’ groups 
suggested by DOI theory 
Experimenters Early adopters Early majority Late majority Non-Adopters 
(1991-1995) (1996-2000) (2001-2004) (2005-2014) up to 2014 
Jordan Armenia Bahrain Singapore Argentina 
Saint Kitts 
& Nevis 
Colombia 
Malta Bangladesh Bolivia 
South 
Africa 
Australia 
Saudi 
Arabia 
Germany 
Netherlands Denmark Bulgaria Tanzania Austria Slovakia Oman 
Peru El Salvador Canada Turkey Barbados Spain Qatar 
Slovenia Fiji Chile Ukraine Belgium Swaziland USA 
Sri Lanka France China 
United 
Kingdom 
Botswana Sweden  
 Georgia Costa Rica Vietnam Brazil Switzerland  
 Kenya 
Czech 
Republic 
Zambia 
Cote 
d'lvoire 
Thailand  
 Latvia Ecuador  Croatia Tunisia  
 Macedonia Guyana  Cyprus UAE  
 Moldova Hong Kong  Egypt Venezuela  
 Mongolia Hungary  Estonia Zimbabwe  
 Paraguay Ireland  Finland   
 Poland Jamaica  Ghana   
 Romania Kazakhstan  Greece   
 South Korea Kyrgyzstan  Iceland   
 
Trinidad & 
Tobago 
Lebanon  India   
 Uganda Lithuania  Indonesia   
 Uruguay Luxembourg  Iran   
  Malawi  Israel   
  Mauritius  Italy   
  Montenegro  Japan   
  Nepal  Kuwait   
  New Zealand  Malaysia   
  Norway  Mexico   
  Panama  Morocco   
  
Papua New 
Guinea 
 Namibia   
  Philippines  Nigeria   
  Russia  Pakistan   
  Serbia  Portugal   
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   Table 2: The operational definition of the research variables and data sources 
Variables Measures Data sources 
Dependent variables   
IFNI ($) 
International financial integration is measured by multiplying the net 
foreign assets in the current local currencies by the annual official 
exchange rates provided by the International Monetary Fund (IMF).  
The International Monetary Fund (IMF), International 
Financial Statistics, the World Development Indicators-
World Bank Data. 
MCPL (%) 
Market capitalisation to GDP ratio is measured by dividing stock market 
capitalisation of a country by its GDP, then multiplied by 100.  
The World Development Indicators-World Bank Data, 
The World Federation of Exchanges database, UN Data, 
the Global Financial Development Database (GFDD), 
SMCP ($) 
The market capitalisation of listed firms is measured by multiplying the 
number of outstanding stocks by the current market price of one share. 
The World Development Indicators-World Bank Data, 
The World Federation of Exchanges database.  
SMTD (%) 
Stock market traded to GDP ratio is measured by using the total number 
of all shares traded in a stock market at the end of the year, multiplied 
by their respective matching prices and divided by GDP, then multiplied 
by 100.  
The World Development Indicators-World Bank Data, 
The World Federation of Exchanges database.  
SMTO (%) 
The stock market turnover ratio is measured by using the total value of 
shares traded in a stock market at the end of the year divided by the 
average market capitalisation for the period, then multiplied by 100.  
The World Development Indicators-World Bank Data, 
The World Federation of Exchanges database.  
SMRT (%) 
The stock market return might be in the form of profit through trading, 
or dividends paid by a company to its shareholders from time to time. 
The Global Financial Development Database (GFDD)- 
provided by the World Bank. 
SPVO 
Stock price volatility is measured by deducting the average from the 
daily stock prices to compute the difference. Then, by squaring the 
differences and dividing them by 360 days to extract the variance and 
calculate the square root of the variance to compute the standard 
deviation, which represents the stock-price volatility. 
The Global Financial Development Database (GFDD)- 
provided by the World Bank. 
FMKD 
Financial market development ranges from 1-7, where ‘1’= indicates 
that a country has not offered any financial services to shareholders, 
whereas ‘7’= denotes that a country has provided a higher level of 
financial services to shareholders. 
The Global Competitiveness Index defined by the World 
Economic Forum.  
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Independent variables Measures Data sources 
ISAAC The adoption categories of the ISAs involve the five adopter groups that 
proposed by the DOI theory, which are:  
Reports on the Observance of Standards and Codes  
EXPRA “1” = Experiments refer to countries adopted the ISAs before 1995  Basis of ISA Adoption by Jurisdiction from the IFAC 
ERADA “2” = Early adopters refer to countries adopted the ISAs 1995-2000  
ERMJA “3” = Early majority refer to countries adopted the ISAs 2001-2006  
LTMJA “4” = Late majority refer to countries adopted the ISAs 2007-2014  
LGGRA “5” = Laggards refer to countries haven't adopted the ISAs till 2014  
ISAAS The adoption status of the ISAs, which includes several groups: Action Plan Template – IFAC 
NOAD “0” = Non-adopters of ISAs (laggards) Basis of ISA Adoption by Jurisdiction from the IFAC 
WIAM “1” = ISAs are the local audit standards with modifications Reports on the Observance of Standards and Codes 
WOAM “2” = ISAs are the local audit standards without amendments (ROSCs) provided by the World Bank Group. 
WITR “3” = ISAs are the local audit standards with translation  
WOTR “4” = ISAs are the local audit standards without translation  
WAMT “5” = ISAs are national standards with modifications & translation  
BLAW “6” = ISAs are required to be adopted mandatory by the law  
GMAT “7” = ISAs only apply in matters not regulated by local audit standards  
IFRSS “8” = Financial statements issued under IFRS must be audited by ISAs  
Control variables  Measures of (Social factors) Data sources 
GERI 
EURO 
NLSA 
CSAS 
EASP 
MENA 
AFRC 
The geographical regions 
“1” = The country is in Europe 
“2” = The country is in North, Latin and South America 
“3” = The country is in Central & South Asia 
“4” = The country is in East Asia & Pacific 
“5” = The country is in the Middle East & North Africa 
“6” = The country is in Sub-Saharan Africa 
The classification of all countries by the continental 
regions presented at the World Bank website 
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Control variables  Measures of (Social factors) Data sources 
OFLN 
ENGL 
FRNL 
SPNL 
ARBL 
GRML 
RUSL 
OTLN 
The official language per group 
“1” = English is an official language in the country  
“2” = French is an official language in the country 
“3” = Spanish is an official language in the country 
“4” = Arabic is an official language in the country 
“5” = German is an official language in the country 
“6” = Russian is an official language in the country 
“7” = Other languages are official languages in the country 
The World Factbook website established by the Central 
Intelligence Agency (CIA). 
COHS 
NEVC 
BRTC 
FRNC 
SPNC 
PORC 
DUTC 
GRMC 
RUSC 
OTCO 
The colonial history 
“0” = Never colonised countries 
“1” = Countries colonised by the British Empire 
“2” = Countries colonised by the French Empire 
“3” = Countries colonised by the Spanish Empire 
“4” = Countries colonised by the Portuguese Empire 
“5” = Countries colonised by the Dutch Empire 
“6” = Countries colonised by the German Empire  
“7” = Countries colonised by the Russian Empire 
“8” = Countries colonised by other colonists 
The World Factbook website established by the Central 
Intelligence Agency (CIA). 
D08-09 Year dummy for the crisis period, where 1= 2008-09, 0 = otherwise Year dummies to control for the financial crisis of 2008 
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Table 1: Summary of the descriptive statistics of 110 countries from 1995 to2014 
Dep Var ISAAC N % Mean Std. D Variance Min Max 
IFNI 
($) 
EXPRA 120 5.5% 21.86 44.85 2.01 -9.54 259.96 
ERADA 380 17.3% 37.66 130.01 16.90 -14.31 885.75 
ERMJA 760 34.5% 75.72 381.17 145.29 -149.39 4,641.46 
LTMJA 840 38.2% 42.12 140.71 19.80 -341.61 1,351.91 
LGGRA 100 4.5% 230.28 607.95 369.61 -535.68 2,288.37 
MCPL 
(%) 
EXPRA 120 5.5% 54.28 48.90 23.91 1.04 298.67 
ERADA 380 17.3% 20.76 26.14 6.83 0.10 106.35 
ERMJA 760 34.5% 64.53 126.65 160.39 0.02 1,254.47 
LTMJA 840 38.2% 52.87 51.18 26.19 0.01 487.88 
LGGRA 100 4.5% 61.70 41.48 17.20 9.46 156.81 
SMCP  
($) 
EXPRA 120 5.5% 111.16 225.79 5.10 0.15 956.16 
ERADA 380 17.3% 125.58 394.07 15.53 0.00 2,740.34 
ERMJA 760 34.5% 248.50 687.83 47.31 0.01 6,004.95 
LTMJA 840 38.2% 257.63 601.92 36.23 0.07 4,614.07 
LGGRA 100 4.5% 3,379.30 6,454.04 4,165.47 2.38 26,330.59 
SMTD 
(%) 
EXPRA 120 5.5% 25.46 45.80 20.98 0.26 200.01 
ERADA 380 17.3% 12.40 30.86 9.52 0.00 172.08 
ERMJA 760 34.5% 24.89 67.09 45.01 0.00 723.59 
LTMJA 840 38.2% 29.77 45.96 21.12 0.00 331.26 
LGGRA 100 4.5% 55.91 85.23 72.64 0.31 387.54 
SMTO 
(%) 
EXPRA 120 5.5% 32.46 43.10 18.58 0.66 207.76 
ERADA 380 17.3% 42.59 113.33 128.44 0.00 1,612.94 
ERMJA 760 34.5% 36.45 56.13 31.51 0.00 580.60 
LTMJA 840 38.2% 48.24 57.35 32.89 0.01 497.40 
LGGRA 100 4.5% 67.73 76.39 58.35 2.39 404.07 
SMRT 
(%)  
EXPRA 120 5.5% 9.15 28.20 7.95 -41.77 129.02 
ERADA 380 17.3% 6.98 28.05 7.87 -54.47 402.46 
ERMJA 760 34.5% 9.92 30.72 9.44 -63.16 378.83 
LTMJA 840 38.2% 11.75 33.55 11.26 -55.02 386.44 
LGGRA 100 4.5% 15.15 22.50 5.06 -40.60 89.73 
SPVO 
(%) 
EXPRA 120 5.5% 15.48 9.09 8.27 1.00 42.89 
ERADA 380 17.3% 13.15 18.23 33.22 1.00 141.58 
ERMJA 760 34.5% 16.64 14.09 19.86 1.00 95.46 
LTMJA 840 38.2% 17.14 11.55 13.33 1.00 63.87 
LGGRA 100 4.5% 19.02 6.95 4.83 7.47 39.59 
FMKD 
(Scale) 
EXPRA 120 5.5% 4.53 0.49 0.24 2.85 5.63 
ERADA 380 17.3% 4.08 0.51 0.26 3.07 5.89 
ERMJA 760 34.5% 4.39 0.77 0.59 3.03 6.40 
LTMJA 840 38.2% 4.35 0.67 0.44 2.86 5.87 
LGGRA 100 4.5% 4.79 0.45 0.20 4.01 5.84 
Note: The variables have been operationally defined in Table 2.  
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Table 2: A summary of all categorical independent and control variables for 110 countries over 1995-2014 
Variables Observations Countries Percent Cumulative % Tolerance VIF 
Independent Variables 
Panel A: ISAAC 
EXPRA 120 6 5.5% 5.5% 0.62 1.61 
ERADA 380 19 17.3% 22.7% 0.66 1.52 
ERMJA 760 38 34.5% 57.3% 0.60 1.66 
LTMJA 840 42 38.2% 95.5% 0.58 1.73 
LGGRA 100 5 4.5% 100% 0.69 1.45 
Total 2200 110 100%       
Panel B: ISAST 
NOAD 1093 102 49.7% 49.7% 0.33 3.05 
WIAM 308 28 14.0% 63.7% 0.45 2.21 
WOAM 106 10 4.8% 68.5% 0.70 1.44 
WITR 344 34 15.6% 84.1% 0.41 2.42 
WOTR 15 1 0.7% 84.8% 0.78 1.29 
WAMT 139 16 6.3% 91.1% 0.51 1.95 
BLAW 177 14 8.0% 99.2% 0.52 1.92 
GMAT 16 2 0.7% 99.9% 0.86 1.16 
IFRSS 2 1 0.1% 100% 0.98 1.02 
Total 2200  100%       
Control Variables 
Panel C: GERE 
EURO 720 36 32.7% 32.7% 0.14 6.92 
LNAM 420 21 19.1% 51.8% 0.21 4.86 
CSAS 220 11 10.0% 61.8% 0.47 2.13 
EASP 300 15 13.6% 75.5% 0.52 1.93 
MENA 260 13 11.8% 87.3% 0.15 6.59 
AFRC 280 14 12.7% 100% 0.38 2.60 
Total 2200 110 100%       
Panel D: OFLN 
ENGL 620 31 28.2% 28.2% 0.28 3.53 
FRNL 60 3 2.7% 30.9% 0.56 1.78 
SPNL 280 14 12.7% 43.6% 0.11 9.13 
ARBL 220 11 10.0% 53.6% 0.13 7.70 
GRML 140 7 6.4% 60.0% 0.46 2.17 
RUSL 60 3 2.7% 62.7% 0.45 2.16 
OTHL 820 41 37.3% 100% 0.25 4.08 
Total 2200 110 100%       
Panel E: COHS 
NEVC 340 17 15.5% 15.5% 0.33 2.99 
BRTC 740 37 33.6% 49.1% 0.17 5.96 
FRNC 100 5 4.5% 53.6% 0.62 1.60 
SPNC 260 13 11.8% 65.5% 0.10 10.26 
PORC 40 2 1.8% 67.3% 0.77 1.30 
DUTC 60 3 2.7% 70.0% 0.57 1.74 
GRMC 40 2 1.8% 71.8% 0.80 1.25 
RUSC 200 10 9.1% 80.9% 0.32 3.14 
OTHC 420 21 19.1% 100% 0.24 4.12 
Total 2200 110 100%       
Note: The panels (A &B) represent the abbreviations of our independent variables. See Table 2. 
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Table 5: Bivariate correlation coefficients for all variables included in this study 
Variables IFNI  MCPL  SMCP  SMTD  SMTO  SMRT  SPVO FMKD EXPRA ERADA ERMJA LTMJA LGGRA NOAD WIAM WOAM WITR WOTR WAMT BLAW GMAT IFRSS GERE OFLN COHS 
IFNI   .361*** .562*** .412*** .303*** .091*** .281*** .230*** .007 -.100*** -.033 .063*** .103*** -.104*** -.015 .108*** .114*** -.082*** .087*** -.114*** .098*** .031 .020 .036* -.177*** 
MCPL  .143***  .745*** .749*** .389*** .096*** .160*** .609*** .067*** -.322*** .008 .163*** .114*** .055** .026 .108*** -.116*** -.133*** .084*** -.107*** .038* -.029 -.051** -.200*** -.382*** 
SMCP  .195*** .176***  .861*** .659*** .125*** .473*** .510*** -.003 -.290*** -.058*** .215*** .160*** .031 -.099*** .177*** -.004 -.132*** .092*** -.143*** .103*** .015 -.151*** .021 -.332*** 
SMTD  .237*** .741*** .444***  .836*** .081*** .456*** .582*** .044** -.259*** -.097*** .215*** .143*** .092*** -.169*** .163*** -.056*** -.134*** .138*** -.114*** .085*** -.027 -.151*** .081*** -.339*** 
SMTO  .195*** .158*** .259*** .458***  .122*** .490*** .375*** -.004 -.110*** -.111*** .152*** .102*** .117*** -.260*** .161*** -.031 -.091*** .170*** -.120*** .093*** -.027 -.232*** .279*** -.190*** 
SMRT  -.018 .024 .001 -.034 .042**  .128*** .064*** -.014 -.082*** -.016 .044** .097*** .109*** -.050** -.012 -.023 -.043** -.060*** -.027 -.026 .048** .007 .033 -.013 
SPVO .094*** .058*** .061*** .201*** .228*** .135***  .155*** .001 -.169*** -.001 .100*** .075*** .076*** -.225*** .020 .155*** -.109*** -.029 -.045** .079*** .037* -.217*** .340*** .056*** 
FMKD .087*** .489*** .211*** .468*** .200*** -.044** .063***  .084*** -.188*** .006 .034 .159*** .100*** -.028 .139*** -.222*** -.103*** -.001 .056*** .065*** -.051** -.125*** -.115*** -.269*** 
EXPRA -.033 .007 -.036 -.002 -.037 -.009 -.014 .064***  -.110*** -.174*** -.189*** -.052** -.239*** -.097*** -.054** .007 -.020 .267*** .370*** -.021 -.007 -.100*** .064*** -.065*** 
ERADA -.037* -.169*** -.065*** -.113*** -.004 -.049** -.105*** -.180*** -.110***  -.332*** -.359*** -.100*** -.278*** .093*** .077*** .141*** .181*** .104*** .011 -.039 -.014 -.088*** .103*** .140*** 
ERMJA .040* .110*** -.056*** -.015 -.070*** -.009 .020 .050** -.174*** -.332***  -.571*** -.159*** -.076*** .208*** .020 .053** -.060*** -.142*** -.046** -.062*** -.022 .009 -.083*** .055*** 
LTMJA -.051** .010 -.052** .053** .056*** .037* .050** .001 -.189*** -.359*** -.571***  -.171*** .308*** -.193*** -.033 -.125*** -.065*** -.043** -.109*** .109*** .038* .097*** .002 -.153*** 
LGGRA .132*** .026 .406*** .118*** .076*** .034 .044** .143*** -.052** -.100*** -.159*** -.171***  .220*** -.088*** -.049** -.094*** -.018 -.057*** -.065*** -.019 -.007 .021 -.070*** .048** 
NOAD -.059*** -.011 .065*** .026 .056*** .055*** .061*** .092*** -.239*** -.278*** -.076*** .308*** .220***  -.401*** -.224*** -.428*** -.082*** -.258*** -.294*** -.085*** -.030 .049** -.042* -.055*** 
WIAM -.045** .021 -.049** -.073*** -.146*** -.056*** -.204*** -.006 -.097*** .093*** .208*** -.193*** -.088*** -.401***  -.091*** -.174*** -.033 -.105*** -.119*** -.035 -.012 .197*** -.343*** -.102*** 
WOAM .229*** .261*** .049** .221*** .090*** -0.016 .010 .154*** -.054** .077*** .020 -0.033 -.049** -.224*** -.091***  -.097*** -.019 -.058*** -.067*** -.019 -.007 .039* -.012 -.146*** 
WITR -.021 -.107*** -.049** -.068*** .018 .054** .175*** -.219*** .007 .141*** .053** -.125*** -.094*** -.428*** -.174*** -.097***  -.036* -.112*** -.127*** -.037* -.013 -.090*** .249*** .237*** 
WOTR -.018 -.050** -.018 -.039* -.047** -.025 -.093*** -.095*** -.020 .181*** -.060*** -.065*** -.018 -.082*** -.033 -.019 -.036*  -.022 -.025 -.007 -.002 .020 .094*** .078*** 
WAMT .039* .036* .013 .088*** .104*** -.058*** -.040* -.002 .267*** .104*** -.142*** -.043** -.057*** -.258*** -.105*** -.058*** -.112*** -.022  -.077*** -.022 -.008 -.130*** .090*** -.081*** 
BLAW -.058*** -.085*** -.063*** -.120*** -.106*** -.027 -.051** .031 .370*** .011 -.046** -.109*** -.065*** -.294*** -.119*** -.067*** -.127*** -.025 -.077***  -.025 -.009 -.136*** .065*** .078*** 
GMAT .141*** .001 .086*** .052** .053** -.026 .061*** .051** -.021 -.039* -.062*** .109*** -.019 -.085*** -.035 -.019 -.037* -.007 -.022 -.025  -.003 -.023 .059*** -.003 
IFRSS -.002 -.015 -.006 -.014 -.017 .048** .026 -.058*** -.007 -.014 -.022 .038* -.007 -.030 -.012 -.007 -.013 -.002 -.008 -.009 -.003  -.008 -.014 .010 
GERE -.009 .026 -.070*** -.060*** -.145*** -0.007 -.164*** -.076*** -.099*** -.097*** -.006 .123*** .011 .053** .200*** .033 -.109*** .004 -.118*** -.121*** -.019 -.015  -.349*** -.323*** 
OFLN .086*** -.187*** -.107*** -.067*** .149*** .053** .330*** -.135*** .060*** .096*** -.068*** -.006 -.071*** -.042 -.340*** -.010 .250*** .092*** .087*** .062*** .061*** -.015 -.325***  .390*** 
COHS -.069*** -.235*** -.147*** -.243*** -.051** .023 .148*** -.232*** -.074*** .158*** .057*** -.148*** .010 -.061*** -.142*** -.133*** .239*** .102*** -.036* .074*** .021 -.003 -.388*** .518***  
Note: The bottom left part of the table represents the Pearson correlation, while the upper right part represents the Spearman correlation. The variables are defined in Table 2. 
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Table 6: The results of multiple linear regression models for 110 countries over 1995-2014 
OLS Regression Models Financial Consequences (dependent variables) 
Dependent variables IFNI MCPL SMCP SMTD SMTO SMRT SPVO FMKD 
Independent variables Coef Coef Coef Coef Coef Coef Coef Coef 
The ISAs Adopters 
DOI Theory Classification)          
EXPRA -0.23*** 11.43 -39.42*** -30.84*** -55.05*** -6.65 -2.36 -0.19** 
 (0.000) (0.314) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.170) (0.208) (0.029) 
ERADA -0.28*** -40.18*** -40.67*** -55.20*** -39.50*** -11.65*** 7.11*** -0.50*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.003) (0.000) (0.000) 
ERMJA -0.20*** 2.62 -38.98*** -40.74*** -45.40*** -8.70** 3.98*** -0.17** 
 (0.000) (0.761) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.018) (0.005) (0.011) 
LTMJA -0.25*** -10.74 -39.03*** -38.41*** -35.92*** -3.56 -2.50* -0.41*** 
 (0.000) (0.189) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.307) (0.064) (0.000) 
The ISAs Status 
Classical classification         
WIAM 4.23** -0.52 -1.32 7.07** -14.46*** 2.81 -2.67*** -0.15*** 
 (0.025) (0.921) (0.185) (0.031) (0.002) (0.211) (0.002) (0.000) 
WOAM 27.83*** 94.97*** 5.67*** 42.88*** 9.61 1.80 -0.39 0.24*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.154) (0.576) (0.756) (0.000) 
WITR 2.41 6.97 2.05** 3.13 0.91 5.60*** 2.14*** -0.13*** 
 (0.165) (0.153) (0.027) (0.303) (0.834) (0.007) (0.008) (0.000) 
WOTR 3.81 27.59 1.77 4.38 -54.08 -10.91 -12.74*** -0.03 
 (0.594) (0.169) (0.461) (0.727) (0.003) (0.203) (0.000) (0.832) 
WAMT 5.47** 18.68** 3.33** 15.65*** 19.59*** -5.99* -6.27*** -0.08 
 (0.036) (0.011) (0.016) (0.001) (0.003) (0.056) (0.000) (0.129) 
BLAW 5.77** -0.27 1.03 -8.13** -20.35*** 0.46 -3.13*** -0.02 
 (0.014) (0.967) (0.409) (0.049) (0.001) (0.869) (0.004) (0.696) 
GMAT 30.57*** -36.45** 18.18*** -8.99 7.83*** -7.31 0.38 0.04 
 (0.000) (0.045) (0.000) (0.428) (0.629) (0.346) (0.899) (0.793) 
IFRSS 8.26 -6.05 3.16 0.91 -7.54 39.99* 13.03 -0.81** 
 (0.641) (0.903) (0.736) (0.977) (0.865) (0.059) (0.112) (0.031) 
Dummy 08-09         
D08-09 1.04 -3.27 -0.58 17.91*** 10.36** -25.89*** 5.88*** 0.14*** 
 (0.570) (0.523) (0.549) (0.000) (0.023) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Control Variables         
Geographical region         
EURO -10.68*** 9.06 -0.78*** 4.92 31.51*** -2.84 1.87 0.59*** 
 (0.000) (0.208) (0.566) (0.273) (0.000) (0.355) (0.116) (0.000) 
LNAM 1.43 35.14*** 19.40*** 26.43*** 23.72*** -3.30 0.66 0.09 
 (0.580) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.286) (0.584) (0.100) 
CSAS -7.23** -5.62 -1.25 5.29 58.90*** 2.07 -0.38 0.08 
 (0.012) (0.484) (0.412) (0.290) (0.000) (0.546) (0.776) (0.192) 
EASP 9.47*** 60.88*** 1.55*** 36.69*** 37.66*** -1.04 6.62*** 0.54*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.226) (0.000) (0.000) (0.719) (0.000) (0.000) 
MENA -13.46*** 7.52 -4.80* -19.76** -16.89 -10.40* -12.53*** 0.44*** 
 (0.005) (0.571) (0.056) (0.017) (0.154) (0.067) (0.000) (0.000) 
Official language         
ENGL -4.61** 74.69*** 2.15* 36.20*** 3.77 -3.09 -6.46*** 0.21*** 
 (0.037) (0.000) (0.067) (0.000) (0.497) (0.245) (0.000) (0.000) 
FRNL 19.13*** 39.58*** 0.32 17.89** -9.99 -3.45 -0.59 0.32*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.882) (0.010) (0.316) (0.470) (0.751) (0.000) 
SPNL -17.01*** 33.97** -1.22 36.74*** 48.87*** -4.83 -1.97 -0.31** 
 (0.004) (0.041) (0.698) (0.000) (0.001) (0.495) (0.472) (0.014) 
ARBL 11.47** 68.51*** -1.25 47.19*** 30.35** 9.47 12.74*** -0.07 
 (0.017) (0.000) (0.625) (0.000) (0.012) (0.101) (0.000) (0.472) 
GRML 14.56*** 49.75*** -6.40*** 22.79*** 8.68 -4.35 -7.33*** 0.60*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.201) (0.181) (0.000) (0.000) 
RUSL -2.41 -19.03 -1.43 -23.15*** 3.12 5.16 10.51*** -0.50*** 
 (0.569) (0.108) (0.524) (0.002) (0.768) (0.308) (0.000) (0.000) 
9 
 
Note: The variables are defined in Table 2. Statistical significance level (p-value) in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Continuation: Table 6 IFNI MCPL SMCP SMTD SMTO SMRT SPVO FMKD 
Colonial history         
NEVC 14.06*** 47.06*** 8.73*** 48.64*** 32.50*** 1.24 1.98** 0.50*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.611) (0.036) (0.000) 
BRTC -9.38*** -38.36*** -1.16 -27.55*** -13.35* -2.85 -6.64*** 0.51*** 
 (0.001) (0.000) (0.426) (0.000) (0.051) (0.385) (0.000) (0.000) 
FRNC -14.40*** -57.43*** 2.87 -32.30*** -23.59*** -5.01 -12.28*** -0.14* 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.135) (0.000) (0.009) (0.248) (0.000) (0.063) 
SPNC 3.42 -59.33*** -21.26*** -70.99*** -91.50*** 9.80 -6.38** 0.51*** 
 (0.622) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.238) (0.047) (0.001) 
PORC -15.38*** -28.23** -23.88*** -41.03*** -27.80** -1.40 -1.01 0.50*** 
 (0.001) (0.037) (0.000) (0.000) (0.021) (0.809) (0.652) (0.000) 
DUTC -5.51 14.43 3.14 -26.79*** -28.39*** -1.88 -7.49*** 0.35*** 
 (0.158) (0.187) (0.130) (0.000) (0.004) (0.687) (0.000) (0.000) 
GRMC -21.54*** -57.67*** 2.03 -52.48*** -34.57*** -3.66 -5.13** -0.30*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.425) (0.000) (0.004) (0.523) (0.021) (0.004) 
RUSC -0.99 2.72 0.70 -2.70 -29.11*** 3.04 -4.55*** 0.04 
 (0.684) (0.690) (0.585) (0.526) (0.000) (0.297) (0.000) (0.498) 
Constant 32.84*** 16.92 39.52*** 45.87*** 65.93*** 21.91*** 24.99*** 3.97*** 
 (0.000) (0.127) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Observations  2200 2200 2200 2200 2200 2200 2200 2200 
Clusters groups 110 110 110 110 110 110 110 110 
F value 20.00*** 32.24*** 37.84*** 42.70*** 20.64*** 6.71*** 28.41*** 45.53*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
R-squared 0.228 0.323 0.359 0.387 0.237 0.090 0.296 0.402 
Adjusted R-squared 0.217 0.313 0.349 0.377 0.222 0.077 0.285 0.393 
Polynomials contrasts 36.21*** 8.08*** 18.36*** 27.90*** 28.73*** 4.43** 5.63** 6.74*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.035) (0.017) (0.009) 
Shapiro-Wilk W test  0.251*** 0.475*** 0.213*** 0.500*** 0.547*** 0.699*** 0.928*** 0.984*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Jarque-Bera LM test 1.46*** 7.25*** 1.16*** 1.75*** 1.86*** 2.05*** 7.33*** 62.5*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Durbin's alternative  8870.8*** 6494.7*** 10391.6*** 12752.7*** 1748.4*** 383.3*** 6303.8*** 13315.5*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Breusch-Godfrey LM 1720.9*** 1510.1*** 1727.9*** 1756.1*** 711.9*** 348.9*** 1525.9*** 1777.2*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Breusch-Pagan test 1051.5*** 9400.1*** 18767.8*** 4397.5*** 392.6*** 492.9*** 279.7*** 32.05*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
White's test chi2 1182.8*** 1453.2*** 1242.4*** 1157.8*** 114.5*** 264.9*** 425.4*** 1172.1*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Levin-Lin-Chu Test -2.74*** -23.30*** -7.43*** -16.01*** -8.83*** -7.96*** -6.56*** -7.86*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Breitung Test  8.55 -7.32*** -6.57*** 0.19 -7.41*** -16.12*** -6.64*** 1.42 
 (0.987) (0.000) (0.000) (0.425) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.922) 
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Table 7: The results of the multiple linear regression with cluster-robust standard errors for 110 countries 
OLS Regression Models Financial Consequences (dependent variables)  
Dependent variables IFNI MCPL SMCP SMTD SMTO SMRT SPVO FMKD Average 
Independent variables Coef Coef Coef Coef Coef Coef Coef Coef Coef 
The ISAs Adopters 
DOI Theory Classification         
 
EXPRA -16.14 -8.74 -20.74** -35.86 -56.91* -13.06*** -3.63 -0.17 -1.539** 
 (0.147) (0.627) (0.010) (0.104) (0.070) (0.009) (0.361) (0.480) (0.021) 
ERADA -19.52* -83.42*** -29.75*** -72.21*** -62.18** -17.90*** -9.60*** -0.49*** -2.54*** 
 (0.064) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.036) (0.000) (0.005) (0.008) (0.000) 
ERMJA -14.44 -18.25 -18.69** -42.87** -53.03* -14.30*** -5.20* -0.17 -1.516** 
 (0.146) (0.251) (0.019) (0.047) (0.074) (0.001) (0.093) (0.348) (0.016) 
LTMJA -15.66 -19.15 -15.11 -30.94 -39.24 -10.38 -3.23 -0.41** -1.123* 
 (0.140) (0.161) (0.152) (0.127) (0.172) (0.118) (0.313) (0.018) (0.061) 
The ISAs Status 
Classical Classification         
 
WIAM 9.94*** 10.21 3.76** -3.43 -18.89** 3.39 -1.98 -0.12 0.052 
 (0.001) (0.228) (0.030) (0.564) (0.027) (0.129) (0.147) (0.216) (0.778) 
WOAM 14.69 47.34** 13.04*** 32.46*** 25.48*** 2.80 0.50 0.25 1.083*** 
 (0.104) (0.012) (0.000) (0.001) (0.009) (0.369) (0.834) (0.124) (0.000) 
WITR 14.42*** 20.17** 7.02*** 7.40 -7.56 1.86 2.09 -0.14 0.417** 
 (0.000) (0.036) (0.001) (0.236) (0.342) (0.477) (0.217) (0.103) (0.022) 
WOTR 2.28 7.68 -1.87 -40.64*** -71.69*** -11.44 -12.13* -0.15 -0.959** 
 (0.791) (0.665) (0.595) (0.000) (0.007) (0.109) (0.065) (0.422) (0.016) 
WAMT 10.53 26.03** 5.45** 21.86*** 24.68*** -6.39*** -5.88** -0.09 0.468** 
 (0.103) (0.039) (0.022) (0.000) (0.005) (0.005) (0.029) (0.505) (0.010) 
BLAW 4.27 -10.08 1.40 -9.46 -23.22** 0.60 -2.71 -0.02 -0.151 
 (0.276) (0.478) (0.592) (0.258) (0.039) (0.875) (0.281) (0.850) (0.576) 
GMAT 26.02* -15.45 10.86*** -2.93 8.27 -7.13*** 1.51 0.05 0.425* 
 (0.063) (0.365) (0.008) (0.771) (0.406) (0.004) (0.822) (0.711) 0.087 
IFRSS 26.65*** -24.80 9.57*** -5.17 -10.42 46.53*** 14.72*** -1.01*** 0.560* 
 (0.000) (0.105) (0.002) (0.593) (0.369) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.088) 
Dummy 08-09          
D08-09 1.62 2.70 1.21*** 16.09*** 10.17*** -35.56*** 5.79*** 0.14*** 0.211*** 
 (0.233) (0.250) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Control Variables          
Geographical region          
EURO -0.09 65.90*** 12.71*** 43.21*** 56.85*** -3.24 3.14 0.56** 1.450*** 
 (0.993) (0.009) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.457) (0.489) (0.011) (0.003) 
LNAM -1.44 82.13*** 11.98 29.28 19.11 -5.88 0.57 0.05 0.880 
 (0.792) (0.004) (0.116) (0.230) (0.486) (0.134) (0.876) (0.878) (0.246) 
CSAS 3.42 22.51 8.62* 32.68** 70.01*** -0.13 0.11 0.10 1.016* 
 (0.749) (0.328) (0.057) (0.030) (0.009) (0.984) (0.986) (0.594) (0.050) 
EASP 14.20 88.45*** 16.05*** 60.21*** 66.61*** -4.41 6.27* 0.52** 1.805*** 
 (0.261) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.233) (0.081) (0.049) (0.000) 
MENA 14.13 51.42* 9.01 18.87 14.81 -10.07* -11.94 0.28 0.690 
 (0.197) (0.057) (0.150) (0.238) (0.487) (0.083) (0.113) (0.661) (0.162) 
Official language         
 
ENGL 0.43 48.40** 3.53 10.72 -10.97 -2.88 -6.47* 0.19 0.106 
 (0.957) (0.014) (0.275) (0.242) (0.370) (0.411) (0.068) (0.329) (0.708) 
FRNL 18.16 59.31** 13.01*** 24.98** -1.93 -0.73 1.30 0.29 0.903** 
 (0.155) (0.012) (0.005) (0.013) (0.920) (0.860) (0.754) (0.121) (0.020) 
SPNL -32.89*** 38.76*** 3.30 15.84* 28.47** -4.73 -1.87 -0.26 0.220 
 (0.000) (0.008) (0.265) (0.075) (0.011) (0.110) (0.478) (0.195) (0.376) 
ARBL 6.43 55.46** 1.93 27.45** 12.80 7.83 12.50* 0.07 0.584* 
 (0.444) (0.024) (0.734) (0.017) (0.421) (0.128) (0.083) (0.905) (0.079) 
GRML 18.34* 41.91** 2.44 16.91 -6.81 -3.98 -7.56* 0.56*** 0.143 
 (0.082) (0.050) (0.488) (0.103) (0.636) (0.250) (0.092) (0.003) (0.640) 
RUSL 7.25 -14.63 -1.90 -13.59 4.50 0.81 7.35 -0.60** -0.103 
 (0.459) (0.604) (0.802) (0.255) (0.910) (0.925) (0.479) (0.027) (0.850) 
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Note: The variables are defined in Table 2. Statistical significance level in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Continuation: Table 7 IFNI MCPL SMCP SMTD SMTO SMRT SPVO FMKD Average 
Colonial history         
 
NEVC 18.68** 58.21*** 16.62*** 44.67*** 40.04*** 3.45 2.66 0.48** 1.380*** 
 (0.017) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.269) (0.386) (0.011) (0.000) 
BRTC -3.24 13.79 0.60 -0.11 -5.09 -0.88 -5.93 0.47** 0.012 
 (0.732) (0.560) (0.875) (0.993) (0.759) (0.822) (0.168) (0.054) (0.973) 
FRNC -9.18 -61.46** -6.78 -33.12** -17.36 -1.76 -10.48** -0.14 -0.893* 
 (0.285) (0.039) (0.180) (0.039) (0.368) (0.757) (0.030) (0.502) (0.053) 
SPNC 44.17*** -80.17** -5.94 -46.19 -65.68* 9.84 -5.01 0.44 -0.773 
 (0.003) (0.019) (0.531) (0.113) (0.064) (0.151) (0.472) (0.300) (0.396) 
PORC -4.95 -11.20 0.37 -4.37 3.17 -0.32 -0.91 0.53 0.166 
 (0.732) (0.680) (0.978) (0.888) (0.937) (0.965) (0.920) (0.110) (0.887) 
DUTC 22.07** 30.67 3.30 -22.11* -51.09* -0.45 -7.72 0.35** -0.297 
 (0.022) (0.375) (0.364) (0.075) (0.096) (0.929) (0.108) (0.037) (0.465) 
GRMC -23.36** -44.27 -10.49** -67.63*** -89.06* 0.33 -3.74 -0.32 -1.78*** 
 (0.021) (0.347) (0.023) (0.004) (0.052) (0.962) (0.754) (0.585) (0.009) 
RUSC -10.76* -38.31** -10.84*** -25.34** -30.78* 3.46 -3.93 0.04 -1.03*** 
 (0.085) (0.011) (0.002) (0.011) (0.074) (0.437) (0.364) (0.853) (0.001) 
Constant 7.38 10.43 5.92 24.71 61.07* 29.43*** 25.31*** 4.01*** 4.991*** 
 (0.629) (0.718) (0.510) (0.346) (0.091) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Observations  2200 2200 2200 2200 2200 2200 2200 2200 2200 
Clusters groups 110 110 110 110 110 110 110 110 110 
F value 27.85*** 68.72*** 84.99*** 80.62*** 57.80*** 11.32*** 33.15*** 41.03*** 89.80*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
R-squared 0.291 0.504 0.557 0.544 0.461 0.143 0.329 0.377 0.570 
Adjusted R-squared 0.281 0.496 0.550 0.537 0.453 0.131 0.319 0.368 0.563 
Polynomials Contrasts 2.50*** 16.09*** 12.10*** 77.86*** 59.12*** 9.97*** 2.75*** 7.92*** 14.53*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.005) (0.005) (0.000) 
Jarque-Bera LM test 0.146 0.241 0.704 0.268 0.484 0.022 0.171 0.393 4.849*** 
 (0.929) (0.887) (0.703) (0.874) (0.785) (0.989) (0.997) (0.822) (0.000) 
Levin-Lin-Chu test  -22.66*** -16.06*** -11.10*** -18.69*** -8.93*** -7.77*** -7.07*** -15.16*** -10.4*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Breitung Test -17.75*** -4.49*** -3.64*** -11.28*** -5.48*** -16.26*** -5.45*** -13.16*** -4.98*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
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Table 8: A comparison between research hypotheses and results 
Hypothesis  Expected sign  Result  Decision  
H1 + - The early adoption of ISA is associated with lower 
stock market integration. 
H2 + - The adoption of ISA cannot predict equity market 
integration. 
H3 + - ISAs adoption is negatively correlated with the total 
value of stock traded 
H4 + - Stock market turnover has significantly decreased 
after the early adoption of ISAs. 
H5 + - There is a significant negative association between 
ISAs adoption and the stock market return. 
H6 - - The early adoption of ISA is attributed to lower 
stock price volatility. 
H7 + - The level of financial market development has been 
significantly reduced following the early ISA adoption. 
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Table 9: The results of the fixed-effects model with cluster-robust standard errors for 110 countries  
Fixed cluster Effects Financial Consequences (dependent variables)  
Dependent variables IFNI MCPL SMCP SMTD SMTO SMRT SPVO FMKD Average 
Independent variables Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. 
The ISAs Adopters 
DOI Theory Classification         
 
EXPRA -16.44 17.29 -13.71* -30.05 -64.71** -13.05*** -5.82 -0.19 -1.230* 
 (0.142) (0.343) (0.092) (0.170) (0.041) (0.007) (0.145) (0.453) (0.069) 
ERADA -19.71* -60.93*** -23.89*** -66.86*** -67.94** -18.01*** -11.43*** -0.50*** -2.276*** 
 (0.053) (0.000) (0.003) (0.002) (0.023) (0.000) (0.001) (0.007) (0.000) 
ERMJA -14.96 -3.53 -14.62* -39.09* -56.90* -14.27*** -6.47** -0.17 -1.329** 
 (0.120) (0.833) (0.068) (0.069) (0.057) (0.000) (0.035) (0.341) (0.036) 
LTMJA -14.39 -10.65 -12.84 -28.99 -41.60 -10.34 -3.95 -0.41** -1.022* 
 (0.136) (0.440) (0.110) (0.151) (0.149) (0.106) (0.213) (0.017) (0.090) 
The ISAs Status 
Classical Classification 
        
 
WIAM 13.59*** -18.71** -3.48* -10.83 -12.93 4.35** -0.27 -0.12 -0.291 
 (0.000) (0.037) (0.064) (0.113) (0.192) (0.039) (0.864) (0.237) (0.162) 
WOAM 6.07 20.30 5.88** 26.10** 32.67*** 2.69 2.75 0.26 0.760*** 
 (0.321) (0.278) (0.018) (0.010) (0.003) (0.313) (0.263) (0.120) (0.003) 
WITR 14.55*** 6.21 0.03 1.37 -0.29 0.39 4.30** -0.14 0.104 
 (0.000) (0.518) (0.991) (0.829) (0.974) (0.891) (0.025) (0.173) (0.575) 
WOTR 1.35* -22.19 -9.35** -48.97*** -65.80** -6.18 -9.97 -0.15 -1.319*** 
 (0.084) (0.223) (0.010) (0.000) (0.017) (0.171) (0.124) (0.424) (0.001) 
WAMT 6.19 1.29 -1.48 16.93*** 33.45*** -5.51*** -3.74 -0.07 0.178 
 (0.459) (0.917) (0.550) (0.004) (0.006) (0.006) (0.171) (0.642) (0.353) 
BLAW 7.25** -35.62** -5.43** -15.43* -16.04 0.27 -0.58 -0.01 -0.456 
 (0.032) (0.013) (0.043) (0.064) (0.157) (0.946) (0.828) (0.926) (0.101) 
GMAT 16.45*** -37.48** 4.54 -7.50 15.91 -4.12 3.51 0.06 0.158 
 (0.000) (0.037) (0.287) (0.465) (0.145) (0.284) (0.606) (0.670) (0.527) 
IFRSS 18.61*** -43.81** 2.39 -3.45 -4.59 47.50*** 19.68*** -0.93*** 0.370 
 (0.000) (0.010) (0.449) (0.731) (0.721) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.272) 
Dummy 08-09          
D08-09 1.63 59.21*** 11.15*** 33.28*** 10.88 -35.53*** 7.29*** 0.10** 0.822*** 
 (0.225) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.153) (0.000) (0.000) (0.028) (0.000) 
Control Variables          
Geographical region          
EURO 0.12 65.26** 12.61*** 42.94*** 56.67*** -3.04 3.16 0.56** 1.442*** 
 (0.990) (0.010) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.489) (0.486) (0.011) (0.004) 
LNAM -1.48 81.68*** 11.91 29.08 19.01 -5.72 0.59 0.05 0.874 
 (0.788) (0.004) (0.116) (0.233) (0.490) (0.148) (0.872) (0.881) (0.249) 
CSAS 4.64 22.46 8.62* 32.72** 70.03*** -0.15 0.12 0.10 1.017* 
 (0.675) (0.327) (0.058) (0.031) (0.009) (0.982) (0.986) (0.594) (0.051) 
EASP 15.56 87.58*** 15.88*** 59.90*** 66.57*** -4.32 6.32* 0.52** 1.795*** 
 (0.214) (0.003) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.249) (0.079) (0.049) (0.000) 
MENA 14.23 51.87* 9.18 18.87 14.43 -10.08* -11.99 0.28 0.695 
 (0.215) (0.061) (0.133) (0.241) (0.499) (0.097) (0.109) (0.666) (0.162) 
Official language          
ENGL -0.73 49.06** 3.59 11.08 -10.62 -3.35 -6.48* 0.19 0.113 
 (0.929) (0.013) (0.266) (0.231) (0.388) (0.350) (0.069) (0.323) (0.689) 
FRNL 19.94 58.68** 13.01*** 24.52** -2.59 -1.08 1.31** 0.28 0.894** 
 (0.131) (0.012) (0.005) (0.015) (0.892) (0.795) (0.753) (0.128) (0.022) 
SPNL -33.15*** 39.74*** 3.57 16.03* 28.09** -5.16* -1.94 -0.26 0.231 
 (0.000) (0.006) (0.231) (0.071) (0.013) (0.088) (0.464) (0.195) (0.353) 
ARBL 6.35 54.53** 1.68 27.26** 13.08 7.64 12.57* 0.08 0.573* 
 (0.468) (0.033) (0.761) (0.020) (0.416) (0.157) (0.078) (0.904) (0.088) 
GRML 19.78** 42.54** 2.59 17.13* -6.82 -4.45 -7.60* 0.57*** 0.151 
 (0.047) (0.045) (0.460) (0.098) (0.636) (0.190) (0.092) (0.003) (0.621) 
RUSL 7.03 -14.61 -1.76 -13.94 3.78 1.34 7.29 -0.60** -0.105 
 (0.447) (0.599) (0.813) (0.239) (0.924) (0.878) (0.486) (0.027) (0.847) 
Continuation: Table 9 IFNI MCPL SMCP SMTD SMTO SMRT SPVO FMKD Average 
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Colonial history          
NEVC 20.32** 56.59*** 16.23*** 44.21*** 40.30*** 3.12*** 2.79 0.48** 1.360*** 
 (0.010) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.318) (0.365) (0.011) (0.000) 
BRTC -2.71 13.84 0.60 -0.08 -5.08 -1.04 -5.93 0.48* 0.012 
 (0.775) (0.557) (0.873) (0.995) (0.761) (0.795) (0.169) (0.055) (0.972) 
FRNC -9.72 -60.52** -6.61 -32.78** -17.25 -1.55 -10.53** -0.14 -0.882* 
 (0.257) (0.044) (0.199) (0.043) (0.374) (0.788) (0.029) (0.510) (0.059) 
SPNC 45.36*** -82.31** -6.51 -46.69 -65.04* 10.10 -4.87 0.44 -0.798 
 (0.001) (0.015) (0.488) (0.109) (0.069) (0.141) (0.485) (0.300) (0.380) 
PORC -4.54 -9.91 0.69 -4.01 2.97 -0.28 -1.01 0.53 0.182 
 (0.750) (0.721) (0.960) (0.898) (0.941) (0.969) (0.911) (0.110) (0.878) 
DUTC 21.06** 28.33 2.59 -22.52* -50.11 -0.92 -7.49 0.35** -0.325 
 (0.024) (0.414) (0.464) (0.070) (0.102) (0.856) (0.120) (0.037) (0.423) 
GRMC -25.13** -43.77** -10.45** -67.37*** -88.80* 0.02 -3.74 -0.31 -1.783** 
 (0.015) (0.343) (0.027) (0.005) (0.052) (0.998) (0.753) (0.588) (0.011) 
RUSC -10.20* -39.39** -11.08*** -25.64** -30.72* 2.96 -3.84 0.04 -1.046*** 
 (0.098) (0.010) (0.002) (0.010) (0.076) (0.503) (0.374) (0.859) (0.001) 
Constant  6.81 -50.63* -1.32 5.97 53.76 29.68*** 25.97*** 3.98*** 
4.457*** 
 
(0.652) (0.078) (0.884) (0.816) (0.134) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Observations 2200 2200 2200 2200 2200 2200 2200 2200 2200 
Clusters groups 110 110 110 110 110 110 110 110 110 
F-value 20.00*** 51.63*** 62.24*** 55.86*** 38.74*** 27.32*** 24.51*** 27.22*** 61.04*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
R-squared  0.317 0.546 0.592 0.565 0.474 0.135 0.363 0.388 0.586 
Adjusted R-squared 0.301 0.535 0.582 0.555 0.462 0.125 0.348 0.374 0.577 
Cox & Snell R Square 0.318 0.546 0.592 0.565 0.474 0.135 0.363 0.388 0.587 
Nagelkerke R-Square 0.318 0.546 0.592 0.565 0.474 0.135 0.363 0.388 0.600 
Sargan-Hansen Statistic  13.2*** 22.92*** 52.97*** 56.28*** 20.76*** 8.46*** 71.93*** 38.50*** 57.53*** 
 (0.000) (0.003) (0.000) (0.000) (0.007) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Wald test (testparm) 4.54*** 17.4*** 20.1*** 10.9*** 7.08*** 11.1*** 11.3*** 6.05*** 27.172*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Note: The variables are defined in Table 2. Statistical significance level in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
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Table 10: The results of instrumental variables (2SLS) estimation for 110 countries from 1995 to 2014  
2SLS Regression Models Financial Consequences (dependent variables)  
Dependent variables IFNI MCPL SMCP SMTD SMTO SMRT SPVO FMKD Average 
Independent variables Coef Coef Coef Coef Coef Coef Coef Coef Coef 
The ISAs Adopters 
DOI Theory Classification         
 
EXPRA -18.66 8.90 -10.20 -7.53 -22.52 -10.97* -1.49 0.15 -26.37 
 (0.119) (0.715) (0.157) (0.720) (0.410) (0.071) (0.746) (0.565) (0.181) 
ERADA -20.03* -63.27*** -21.25*** -48.21** -35.74 -16.39*** -8.29** -0.17 -6.059 
 (0.069) (0.004) (0.003) (0.016) (0.161) (0.003) (0.028) (0.311) (0.633) 
ERMJA -17.43* -12.50 -10.40 -22.09 -24.14 -12.50** -3.00 0.06 -6.329 
 (0.097) (0.569) (0.140) (0.262) (0.340) (0.015) (0.402) (0.971) (0.593) 
LTMJA -16.88 -3.42 -8.66 -12.81 -21.04 -8.70* -2.10 -0.15 4.085 
 (0.116) (0.848) (0.209) (0.491) (0.385) (0.061) (0.556) (0.377) (0.654) 
The ISAs Status 
Classical Classification         
 
WIAM 9.48*** 9.92 3.55** -5.58 -24.09** 4.60* -1.32 -0.14* -2.004 
 (0.003) (0.234) (0.014) (0.381) (0.004) (0.047) (0.344) (0.092) (0.425) 
WOAM 13.45* 38.73** 10.89*** 24.90** 15.75 4.10 1.29 0.14 -1.443 
 (0.084) (0.027) (0.000) (0.014) (0.148) (0.225) (0.615) (0.227) (0.611) 
WITR 13.79*** 18.42** 6.11*** 2.82 -14.96* 2.66 2.30 -0.19** 1.730* 
 (0.000) (0.048) (0.001) (0.639) (0.052) (0.331) (0.189) (0.022) (0.079) 
WOTR 4.72 -16.62 -4.88 -55.43*** -81.02*** -10.21 -10.28* -0.49*** 0.849 
 (0.545) (0.304) (0.146) (0.000) (0.005) (0.137) (0.096) (0.004) (0.628) 
WAMT 17.16** 28.01** 7.36*** 19.51** 18.53 -2.60 -3.19 -0.13 9.090 
 (0.017) (0.038) (0.001) (0.012) (0.146) (0.345) (0.201) (0.351) (0.254) 
BLAW 0.70 -14.65 1.98 -12.94 -27.28** 1.90 -2.07 -0.08 8.398 
 (0.869) (0.338) (0.444) (0.134) (0.010) (0.637) (0.421) (0.544) (0.281) 
GMAT 32.23* -17.61 4.62 -19.59** -20.11* -5.73** 1.60 -0.06 1.953 
 (0.077) (0.251) (0.155) (0.030) (0.079) (0.046) (0.805) (0.596) (0.125) 
IFRSS 33.12*** -35.06** 5.95** -13.38 -16.89 46.14*** 15.19*** -1.18*** 0.585 
 (0.000) (0.030) (0.048) (0.191) (0.136) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.473) 
Dummy 08-09          
D08-09 2.97** 1.78 0.96** 14.68*** 8.26*** -35.13*** 6.15*** 0.12*** -0.230 
 (0.036) (0.484) (0.012) (0.000) (0.003) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.687) 
Control Variables          
Geographical region          
EURO -0.08 20.45 6.95 24.14 54.03** -4.12 4.83 0.08 5.652 
 (0.994) (0.394) (0.116) (0.149) (0.019) (0.397) (0.332) (0.971) (0.167) 
LNAM 2.52 68.12*** 9.85* 20.03 12.65 -5.09 1.95 -0.18 0.724 
 (0.628) (0.007) (0.073) (0.308) (0.583) (0.191) (0.572) (0.519) (0.105) 
CSAS 6.58 17.82 6.46 28.13* 65.47** -0.33 0.26 0.06 5.050 
 (0.509) (0.423) (0.133) (0.071) (0.012) (0.959) (0.966) (0.929) (0.213) 
EASP 6.86 53.29** 14.11*** 49.29*** 70.02*** -4.81 7.49** 0.14 2.962** 
 (0.529) (0.032) (0.001) (0.002) (0.000) (0.215) (0.045) (0.563) 0.032 
MENA 9.41 16.01 3.56 3.91 11.73 -11.84* -11.77 -0.12 3.272 
 (0.330) (0.519) (0.482) (0.805) (0.586) (0.089) (0.182) (0.839) (0.257) 
Official language         
 
ENGL 0.19 42.66** 4.90 12.09 -6.06 -1.70 -5.13 0.14 -1.769 
 (0.978) (0.018) (0.122) (0.206) (0.580) (0.618) (0.149) (0.421) (0.319) 
FRNL 11.25 44.48*** 8.81* 13.42 -12.87 -2.00 0.14 0.12 -3.419 
 (0.462) (0.005) (0.056) (0.253) (0.423) (0.655) (0.974) (0.632) (0.355) 
SPNL -31.44*** 44.99*** 3.61 16.99** 27.93** -5.28* -2.51 -0.20 -3.460 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.122) (0.031) (0.010) (0.087) (0.346) (0.255) (0.295) 
ARBL 5.17 50.33** 1.73 17.63 4.10 7.25 11.72 -0.06 -0.293 
 (0.450) (0.039) (0.745) (0.168) (0.812) (0.304) (0.194) (0.918) (0.775) 
GRML 19.73* 1.60 -0.91 4.87 -2.95 -3.34 -4.61 0.10 0.069 
 (0.089) (0.937) (0.838) (0.659) (0.843) (0.386) (0.341) (0.607) (0.944) 
RUSL 0.12 -33.59 -5.49 -20.78 3.94 -1.44 6.23 -0.78*** -1.796 
 (0.989) (0.189) (0.378) (0.101) (0.925) (0.860) (0.518) (0.000) (0.357) 
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Note: The variables are defined in Table 2. Statistical significance level (p-value) in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Continuation: Table 10 IFNI MCPL SMCP SMTD SMTO SMRT SPVO FMKD Average 
Colonial history         
 
NEVC 17.66** 40.62*** 12.29*** 34.81*** 33.81*** 2.51 2.57 0.28* 3.374** 
 (0.028) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.006) (0.430) (0.416) (0.098) (0.036) 
BRTC -6.41 -10.22 -2.53 -8.93 -4.07 -2.48 -5.94 0.21 6.176 
 (0.405) (0.623) (0.513) (0.496) (0.809) (0.542) (0.192) (0.360) (0.295) 
FRNC -6.12 -57.70* -2.81 -19.78 0.04 0.04 -8.25 -0.04 2.624 
 (0.520) (0.056) (0.614) (0.266) (0.998) (0.995) (0.138) (0.856) (0.347) 
SPNC 33.33** -94.34*** -9.06 -49.75** -59.23* 7.82 -5.68 0.28 8.097 
 (0.017) (0.001) (0.215) (0.041) (0.059) (0.260) (0.410) (0.469) (0.315) 
PORC -13.15 -23.80 -0.76 0.22 16.56 -2.63 -1.74 0.50* 6.836 
 (0.395) (0.340) (0.943) (0.993) (0.598) (0.708) (0.838) (0.062) (0.377) 
DUTC 19.84** -12.51 1.84 -25.67* -30.27 -1.68 -5.31 0.08 1.220 
 (0.041) (0.481) (0.633) (0.090) (0.128) (0.775) (0.213) (0.785) (0.363) 
GRMC -30.22*** -39.34 -9.85* -62.04*** -83.61* -1.12 -5.26 -0.19 3.316 
 (0.001) (0.393) (0.075) (0.009) (0.083) (0.881) (0.680) (0.723) (0.458) 
RUSC -12.43** -37.90*** -6.30** -18.53* -19.24 4.78 -2.58 0.06 -5.153 
 (0.045) (0.003) (0.024) (0.052) (0.274) (0.282) (0.520) (0.704) (0.205) 
Constant 11.78 -9.74 6.60 16.79 52.25 29.91*** 25.36*** 3.92*** -5.275 
 (0.416) (0.727) (0.417) (0.493) (0.105) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.704) 
Observations  2200 2200 2200 2200 2200 2200 2200 2200 2200 
Clusters groups 110 110 110 110 110 110 110 110 110 
F value 396.3*** 149.5*** 298.2*** 266.1*** 274.3*** 209.8*** 322.3*** 899.8*** 48.82*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Adjusted R-squared 0.343 0.551 0.643 0.578 0.492 0.132 0.339 0.472 0.520 
The SW Chi2 test for underid          
EXPRA 7.67* 7.67* 7.67* 7.67* 7.67* 7.67* 7.67* 7.67* 7.67* 
 (0.053) (0.053) (0.053) (0.053) (0.053) (0.053) (0.053) (0.053) (0.053) 
ERADA 8.07** 8.07** 8.07** 8.07** 8.07** 8.07** 8.07** 8.07** 8.07** 
 (0.044) (0.044) (0.044) (0.044) (0.044) (0.044) (0.044) (0.044) (0.044) 
ERMJA 7.51** 7.51** 7.51** 7.51** 7.51** 7.51** 7.51** 7.51** 7.51** 
 (0.047) (0.047) (0.047) (0.047) (0.047) (0.047) (0.047) (0.047) (0.047) 
LTMJA 7.65* 7.65* 7.65* 7.65* 7.65* 7.65* 7.65* 7.65* 7.65* 
 (0.053) (0.053) (0.053) (0.053) (0.053) (0.053) (0.053) (0.053) (0.053) 
The LM test of IV redundancy 371.7*** 371.7*** 371.7*** 371.7*** 371.7*** 371.7*** 371.7*** 371.7*** 371.7*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
The Sargan-Hansen of overid 3.98 1.05 2.73 0.54 1.07 2.71 3.49 0.22 5.646* 
 (0.137) (0.593) (0.112) (0.764) (0.585) (0.258) (0.175) (0.894) (0.059) 
The C statistic of endogeneity 26.33*** 201.9*** 116.1*** 129.7*** 139.2*** 3.30 39.15*** 275.2*** 114.64*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.509) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Reset test of omitted variables 2.24 2.53 0.14 2.52 1.37 0.94 0.96 1.49 0.02 
 (0.135) (0.112) (0.708) (0.113) (0.243) (0.325) (0.328) (0.223) (0.893) 
